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ABSTRACT 
 
 
       XUANLI XIE: Growth and Renewal: How Does Organizational Experience  
Affect Diversification in Early and Mature Organizations 
(Under the direction of Hugh O’Neill) 
 
 
This dissertation presents a theory on how organizational experience affects decisions 
by organizations to enter new product-markets. Facing the choice of new product-markets, a 
firm might decide to introduce a related product, which leverages existing firm knowledge 
and capabilities, or to experiment with a less related product, which requires new knowledge 
and capabilities. Learning and evolutionary theory suggests firms tend to diversify into 
related knowledge areas. Consistent with this view of local search, the first question 
examined in this study is how a firm’s technology and market experience affect its product-
market entry choice. While local search is considered dominant, it might not be a 
homogenous process across all types of organizations. Organizations at different stages differ 
in organizational size, structure, and cognitive styles. These factors interact with the process 
of experiential learning, leading to divergent learning results. The second question in this 
study examined how experience affects organizations at different stages. Finally, I propose 
that organizational knowledge diversity and organizational access to innovative knowledge 
are concrete examples of dynamic capabilities that might weaken the path-dependency of 
existing technology or market experience, leading to distant product-market entries. 
The product-market entry choices were examined using a model that integrates 
organizational characteristics with organizational learning. The data are on new drug 
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introductions in the generic pharmaceutical industry. This dataset covers the whole 
population of generic pharmaceutical firms in the US from 1984-2004, including firms at a 
variety of ages and stages. 
The analyses showed clear support for the relationship between experience and 
related product-market entries. And strong evidence was found for the heterogeneity of this 
relationship across organizations. The most interesting results are the heterogeneous 
diversification behavior between new ventures and established firms. Compared to 
established firms (older firms), new ventures (younger firms) are more likely to enter related 
product-markets, and less likely to enter product-markets with many competitors. The two 
organizational features, knowledge diversity and access to innovative knowledge, were also 
found to moderate the relationship between experience and product-market entries. Firms 
with diverse knowledge and access to innovative knowledge are less likely to enter related 
product markets.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
The Research Issue 
 
In 2001, Apple computer introduced a new product, IPod. This new product became 
so popular that in the first quarter of 2006, Apple sold 8.5 million units and generated $1.71 
billion in revenue. Only two years before, the legendary entrepreneurial company that had 
introduced the first personal computer, Macintosh, had a sluggish performance with only 2% 
share of the personal-computing market (Schlender, 2005). Ipod put Apple Computer back to 
the center of the stage. Not only the company’s stock price and profit more than tripled, IPod 
also brought Apple “out of its box as a boutique computer maker and emerged as a force to 
be reckoned within consumer electronics, music, and who knows what else (Schlender, 
2005).”  
The introduction of new products is critical need for all companies. New products are 
necessity for growth. For example, HP as a classic entrepreneurial company expanded its 
products from one in 1938 to more than one hundred in 1952. Cofounder Mr. Packard 
commented,  “A single product rarely makes a successful company” (Packard, 1996).   New 
products could also mean renewal. The case of Apple Computer illustrated how does a well-
executed new product change the fate of a company and even rattle the whole industry. 
The search to understand product diversification is one of the central themes in 
strategic management research (Rumelt, Schendel & Teece, 1994). Although organizations 
may choose to specialize in only one product, single-product firms are the exception rather 
than the rule (Teece, 1994). One product is rarely sufficient for success, and the introduction 
   
  2
of new products is critical for firm survival and growth, especially when market conditions 
are dynamic and changing (Kim & Kogut, 1996). By extending and expanding product lines, 
a new venture grows in size and volume, develops diverse and complementary assets and 
capabilities, and, with success, comes to resemble more established entities (Penrose, 1959; 
Ansoff, 1965; Bhide, 2000). But exactly how do organizations introduce new products over 
time? Organizations can exploit current resources or explore new activities (March, 1991). 
As such, a firm might decide to introduce a related product, which leverages existing firm 
knowledge and capabilities, or to experiment with a less related product, which requires new 
knowledge and capabilities, or to do both simultaneously. These decisions form the unique 
evolutionary trajectory of each firm, and ultimately determine its long-term fate. The central 
research question of this dissertation is about this choice. Specifically, I ask: “what 
determines a company’s direction of product diversification in early stages of firm 
formation?” 
A major conclusion of product diversification research is that firms tend to diversify 
into related knowledge areas (Farjoun, 1994; Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991; Chang, 1996). 
As such, experience, or knowledge accumulated in the past, is the basis for new product 
entries (Ingram & Baum, 1997; Levintal & Myatt, 1994).  Two divergent views of how 
experience guide new product-market entry exists. One view argues that since local search 
efforts are common, and lead to product market choices guided by previous experience, 
experience can create strong path dependency (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi & Winter, 1994). Based 
on this view, the more experience a firm gains in a particular area, the more likely it 
introduces a new product proximal to that area (Martin & Mitchell, 1998; Stuart & Podolny, 
1996).  The path-dependent nature of experiential learning suggests the likelihood of entering 
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a related product will be stronger as firms accumulate more experience. This tendency can 
lead firms to develop ‘core-rigidities’ (Leonard-Barton, 1995) or fall into ‘competency traps’ 
(Levitt & March, 1988). The other view, on the contrary, argues experience may also be the 
base of exploration. Researchers holding this view indicate path-breaking change is possible 
(Karim & Mitchell, 2000), and firms can move away from their existing knowledge domain 
(Stuart & Podolny, 1996). For example, Helfat and Raubitschek (2000) argue firms can use 
“step function learning” to fundamentally change their knowledge base. The idea is that firms 
can reconfigure its knowledge bases. Kogut and Zander (1992) define the ability to 
synthesize and apply current and acquired knowledge as “combinative capability”. 
Henderson and Cockburn (1994) call the ability to combine and integrate  “architectural 
knowledge”.  This views suggests that the more experience a firm has, the more raw material 
are available for the firm to recombine knowledge elements and create new linkages, and 
thus the greater the likelihood of distant product-market entries. 
In this dissertation, I argue that the key to solve the divergent views about product 
innovation lies in the better understanding of organizational experience. In existing literature, 
experiences tend to be studied from a single dimension such as technology experience 
(Sorenson & Stuart, 2000; Martin & Mitchell, 1998) and the effect of organizational forms 
and features are generally ignored. Technology is only one aspect of firm experience. Market 
experience also contributes to an organization’s new product introduction patterns (Danneels, 
2002).  
In addition, studies examining organizational experience rarely pay attention to the 
difference between new and more established organizations.  Since key organizational 
features influence the interpretation and use of experience (Dobrev, Kim and Carroll, 2003), I 
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expect experiences have different impact on early versus mature organizations in terms of 
product diversification choices.  Furthermore, although previous studies illustrates the 
existence of ‘combinative capability’ or ‘step-function learning’, we still lack an in depth 
exploration of these “black box” processes. My research seeks to understand how 
experience/knowledge influences the capability to embrace new knowledge and to upgrade a 
firm’s existing knowledge base.  
Given the importance of understanding the relationship between experience and firm 
new product-market entries, the primary goal of this dissertation is to explore how early and 
mature stage organizations make new product-market choices following their first products. 
By doing so, this dissertation fills the gap in previous literature in three ways. First, I study 
experience in greater detail by examining both technology and market experience embedded 
in a firm’s product. Second, I integrate organizational features (age) with organizational 
experience. This leads to a better understanding of product diversification in early stage firms, 
and also provides a more complete picture of how experience affects new product-market 
choice. Finally, I propose two organizational features (access to innovative knowledge, and 
knowledge diversity) as concrete examples of “architectural knowledge” or “combinative 
capability”. By studying the new product-market choices beyond the initial product, the 
dissertation provides a theoretical and empirical explanation of an organizations’ “second 
act.”  
 
A Conceptual Model 
 
While there has been extensive study on the initial genesis of the organization (start-
up), and decades of study on large firm diversification, there is only limited evidence or 
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consensus on the antecedents of firm product-market entry in the context of early stage firms. 
The literature based on mature organizations, however, highlights some common antecedents 
of firm new product choices. Those themes receiving the most attention in the literature 
include industry characteristics (Teece, 1982; Dundas & Richardson, 1980; Miles, 1982; 
Lecraw, 1984) and firm resources (Penrose, 1959; Silverman, 1999; Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 
1991). Typically, each of these elements has been studied separately from the other, and 
generally in the context of large and mature organizations.  
The notion that external markets serve as the antecedents of new product-market 
entry is grounded in IO economic and organization theories. IO economists suggest firms 
will enter markets that provide greater profitability (Bain, 1956). In sociology, ecological 
theory highlights the role of market density in firm market entry and argues organizations 
tend to enter markets with moderate population density so that they can avoid uncertainty and 
competition (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Havemean, 1993; Greve, 2000). Both theories indicate 
firms are likely to diversify into product markets with attractive features such as moderate 
density and growing demand. While these perspectives offer plausible explanations of firms’ 
diversification direction, it seems contradict to the observation that firms respond to market 
opportunities in distinctly different, and perhaps unique, ways (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Mitchell, 1989; 1991). 
 The resource-based (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) and 
capabilities-based (Teece, pisano & Shuen, 1990) perspective, on the other hand, suggest 
firms introduce new products in order to exploit their core capabilities or intangible resources, 
thus benefit from economies of scale or economies of scope. This perspective argues firms 
tend to enter a product-market to apply existing resources or capabilities (Chatterjee & 
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Wernerfelt, 1991). Firm diversification exhibits a recognizable pattern (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi 
& Winter, 1994), but that pattern is constrained by the legacy resources of the firm. On the 
one hand, legacy resource and capabilities may allow firms to excel in a particular area, and 
exploiting these existing capabilities provides more certain rewards for the firms (March, 
1991). On the other hand, legacy resources and capabilities constrain firms from searching 
distant new capabilities, since experimenting with new activities provide less certain returns 
(March, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Thus firms tend to diversify into product markets 
that that replicate routines and knowledge profiles of existing product markets (Chang, 1996). 
The resource and capability based perspective, joined with a learning perspective, seem 
particularly well suited to understanding diversification.  
However, at least three theoretical and empirical issues remain to be answered. First, 
does the extent body of diversification literature, based as it on large sample studies Fortune 
500 firms or publicly traded firms, provide a good basis for understanding earlier stage 
pattern of diversification? The use of mature firms creates a sample selection and survivor 
bias (Heckman, 1979) because small, young and private firms are neglected. A similar, but 
less obvious, bias occurs in other literature, also. For example, the capabilities based 
perspective of diversification arguments implicitly assumes that firms already have core 
capabilities in place, which might be true for large mature organizations, but could hardly be 
so for small and young organizations. Because of their short-term of operations, new 
ventures are still in the process of forming their distinctive routines and capabilities. For new 
ventures, business entry is more like a search and experimentation process whereby 
entrepreneurs explore a variety of strategies to determine what is the appropriate one to the 
firm’s competitive situation (Nicholls-Nixon, Cooper & Woo, 2000). To get a full picture of 
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organizational evolution, then, we must study new ventures in order to understand the origin 
and formation of organizational capabilities.  
Second, how do firms develop capabilities that will facilitate entry into new product-
markets? Existing theories have provided arguments and evidence on how existing 
knowledge and capabilities are exploited in related product-markets. Yet little has been 
offered on how some knowledge and capabilities can become stepping-stones for creating 
new knowledge in less related product-markets. In addition to examining how knowledge 
and experiences constrains firm entry choices, we need to know how firms break away from 
the constraints of experience, adapt to the gap between the experience and the requirement of 
new product-market. The capability to upgrade firm knowledge base is also called “dynamic 
capability” (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997), which differs from the traditional resource-based 
view’s logic of leverage (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  The path to path-breaking change is 
hidden far in the past of the firms that garner the most research attention. 
Finally, what is the right way to capture knowledge and capabilities in early stage of 
the firm? The classic entrepreneurial literature addresses the firm’s first entry and early 
resource formation, yet tangible resources (venture capital) need to be turned into less 
tangible resources, as the firm grows. Literature generally follows two paths to capture these 
less tangible knowledge assets. The first path uses managers’ knowledge and capabilities as 
surrogates for the knowledge and capabilities of the firm (e.g. Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1990; Shane & Stuart, 2002). This approach proves useful at the founding stage of new 
ventures, but becomes problematic when ventures grow beyond individuals’ knowledge and 
early founders and managers exit the venture. The second approach relies on firm level 
measures, through the use of patent data (e.g. Gittelman & Kogut, 2003; Nerkar & Roberts, 
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2004; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Silverman, 1999). This approach allows a better measurement 
of organizational level knowledge, especially technology knowledge. However, because not 
all knowledge can be patented, patents can only capture a small portion of firms’ market and 
production knowledge, and only a minority of new ventures.  
In this dissertation, I set out to develop a model of firm new product choices focusing 
on the role of organizational knowledge and experience. The core research question is: How 
do knowledge and experience affect early and mature organizations choices entering new 
product-markets? To further explore the concept of firm knowledge and experience, I 
examine firm knowledge and experience from three aspects.  
First, I examine knowledge and experience at the organizational level through the 
products a firm offers to the market. Because products have both technology and market 
components (Cooper, 1993; Mitchell, 1992), I am able to study knowledge and experience 
from two dimensions. The first dimension is firm technology experience. The second 
dimension is firm market experience. I argue that two types of knowledge might exert 
different influences on firm new product-market choices.  
Besides studying knowledge and experience imbedded in existing products, I also 
explore how experience affects organizations at different life-stages. As organizations grow, 
the more experience they gain in a particular task, the more competent they become in 
performing that task. An organization is subjected to two forms of influence from past 
experience. First, greater experience in a particular area acts as an incentive for firms to 
specialize, which will decrease deviation from current expertise and create greater 
specialization. Secondly, experience also allows firms to generate greater and more stable 
returns, which will create slack to experiment with new activities and reduce specialization. 
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Thus aging might have two distinct yet equally important impacts on firm new product 
choice. In this dissertation, I investigate following questions specifically: (1) does experience 
in a particular area influence new venture product-market entry the same way as it influence 
mature organizations? (2) As organization ages, does the influence of experience on product-
market entries change? 
Finally, I investigate the effect of organizational features on the relationship between 
experience and firm new product-market entries. Here my key focus is organizational 
knowledge structure. Two structural features are examined. The first type of organizational 
feature is organizational knowledge diversity. Firms that have a more diverse knowledge 
base will be less constrained by a particular area and easier to recombine and make new 
linkages of existing knowledge. The second organizational feature refers to organizational 
access to innovative knowledge. Firms that have access to innovative fields or divisions 
might be able to span internal knowledge boundaries and are more likely to enter distant 
product-markets. I propose that these two organizational features are concrete examples of 
dynamic capabilities that might weaken the path-dependency of existing technology or 
market experience. The general model is depicted in Figure 1.1.  
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Figure 1.1  The General Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Questions and Methodology Overview 
 
The research issue investigated in this study is how firm knowledge and experience 
influence the choice of new product-markets, in new ventures and mature organizations. 
Three specific research questions are addressed to facilitate the investigation into this 
research issue. The three research questions are: 
1. How do market and technology experience affect new and mature organizations’ 
product-market choices?  
2. How does experience affect firm choices over time? In another word, does experience 
affect new ventures and established firms in different ways? 
3. How do certain organizational features affect firm product-market choices? 
Firm Experience 
Technology 
Market 
New Product-market Entry 
Technology 
Market 
Organizational Features: 
Knowledge Breadth 
Access to Innovative Knowledge
The Effect of Aging 
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To address these questions, this study uses a research design employing both 
qualitative and quantitative data sources. The study focused on pharmaceutical industry, 
especially generic pharmaceutical companies. Because of the lack of theoretical and 
empirical evidence of new venture product-market entries, I conducted qualitative studies to 
validate the theoretical model. Interviews were conducted with top management team 
members in pharmaceutical start-ups. The longitudinal archival data on generic 
pharmaceutical industry served the quantitative data analysis. The generic pharmaceutical 
industry can trace its founding to the mid-1960s, when an effort by the government to prove 
the safety and effectiveness of pharmaceuticals manufactured prior to 1962 opened the door 
for the full scale development of generic products. However, the modern generic 
pharmaceutical industry did not came to existence until the Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984, 
which lowered the entry barrier of generic firm by eliminating the duplicative testing 
required for generic substitutes. This study followed generic pharmaceutical industry from 
1984 to 2004, covering the majority of modern generic pharmaceutical industry history. The 
population of generic firms was formed by examining FDA’s Abbreviated New Drug 
Applications (ANDAs) during 1984 to 2004, since gaining FDA approval is mandated for 
producing and marketing generic drugs.  
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation consists of five additional chapters. The literature review in 
Chapter Two includes an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature in the area of 
antecedents of firm product-market entries. The review will focus on organizational 
knowledge and experience. Literature on new venture product-market entries is also 
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reviewed. Chapter Three attempts to integrate the diverse arguments and provides a 
theoretical model regarding the relationship between organizational experience and product-
market entries. First, learning theory as an organization-level theory of action was used to 
integrate ideas on the different forces of experience. Then key concepts of organizational 
features are presented, leading to model and hypotheses. Chapter Four describes the 
methodology, measurement and data used in this study. Chapter Five reports the results from 
the interviews. Chapter Six presents results from longitudinal archival data analyses. Finally 
Chapter Seven discusses the research findings and implications of this project.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This dissertation examines product diversification in early and mature organizations. 
First, an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature examining product 
diversification is provided. Specific attention is given to the literature highlighting 
diversification motivation and direction. Next, a more fragmented literature examining new 
venture diversification is reviewed. This literature provides evidence to challenge the 
applicability of existing diversification literature on new ventures.  Finally, a framework on 
learning and evolution is reviewed. This perspective provides a basis to understand the 
relationship between firm knowledge/experience and new product diversification. 
 
Diversification 
 
A considerable body of research on diversification stems from the fields of economics 
and strategic management. While this well developed literature stream highlights the 
importance of resource sharing in firm diversification, it provides little insight into new 
venture diversification. Rather, this literature examines diversification from a rearward 
looking perspective and focus on large and mature organizations. This literature is briefly 
reviewed in the following sections.  
Diversification Causes 
 
Researchers form finance, economics and strategy have explored many different 
motivations for diversification. Much research in finance has viewed diversification as 
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motivated by the benefit arising from risk reduction (Markham, 1973). The argument is that 
when the cash flows of multi-businesses are not perfectly correlated, the total risk is reduced 
by diversification. However, this view is also challenged by the counter argument that the 
same reduction of risk can be achieved by shareholders diversifying their own portfolio of 
financial assets (Levy & Sarnat, 1970). IO economists, on the other hand, examined 
diversification as motivated by firms’ desire to gain “conglomerate power” (Hill, 1985) or to 
defend against prospects of decline in their dominant industry (Miles, 1982; Rumelt, 1974). 
This line of research was guided by the IO structure-conduct-performance framework and 
argues industry structure determines diversification strategy and performance. In addition, 
diversification has been seen as motivated by mangers’ personal interests because 
diversification may reduce employment risk of top executives (Amihud & Lev, 1981). While 
these perspectives help explain the incentives for firms to diversify, a firm must have the 
necessary resources in order to make diversification economically feasible (Hoskisson & Hitt, 
1990). Thus, the resource-based view offers another important explanation for firm 
diversification. 
Unlike other economic theories, the resource-based view acknowledges the 
imperfection in the market and focuses on the heterogeneity, not homogeneity, of firms. The 
resource-based view suggests that the firm is a collection of sticky and imperfectly imitable 
resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Firms diversify in response to excess resources 
(Penrose, 1959) when these resources cannot be efficiently sold in the market due to the 
market failure generated from resource stickiness (Teece, 1982).  These resources can be 
physical, such as production equipment or innovations protected by patents, or intangible, 
such as brand equity or operating routines. Sharing these resources across multiple products 
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or markets successfully can result in synergistic gain from the economies of scope and the 
economies of scale, which becomes an incentive for firm to expand. As Penrose (1959) 
observed: 
“…as long as expansion can provide a way of using the services of its resources more 
profitably than they are being used, a firm has an incentive to expand…” 
 
Finally, organizational performance feedback may also be a reason for firms to 
diversify (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). First, as behavioral theories suggests, performance below 
aspiration levels will increase firm search activity (Cyert & March, 1963), leading to greater 
likelihood of change, such as diversification.  Organizational performance may also motivate 
firm diversification by changing managers’ risk preference. Individuals show risk aversion 
when performance is satisfactory, but are prone to take risks when performance is lower than 
aspiration level (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Greater level of risk-taking might increase the 
likelihood of diversification. The linkage between low performance and diversification 
received some empirical support (e.g. Bowman, 1982; Grant, Jamine & Tomas, 1988; Park, 
2002, 2003). However, when firm performance is good, firm may also increase 
diversification because increased organizational resource allow experimentation and 
organizational search (Cyert & March, 1963). Miles (1982) and Grant and colleagues (1988) 
found that high-profit firms tend to engage in more acquisition activities than low-profit 
firms.  
In sum, the following diversification motives were identified from the literature. 
1. Financial risk reduction  
2. Managerial motivation  
3. Market power  
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4. Escape from declining market  
5. Resource sharing  
6. Poor organizational performance /Good organizational performance 
These motives can be categorized into two types. The first type of diversification 
occurs to correct past mistakes, such as low levels of organizational and industry 
performance. The second type of diversification is designed to improve and build on current 
operations. For example, an increase in market power can improve a firm’s current market 
position. Similarly, resource sharing leads to better use current recourses.  
These perspectives, based as they are on the firm’s past history, all share a rearward 
focus. In a changing competitive environment, while improvement of current organizational 
capability is important, an organization must also build new strategic capabilities by 
exploring new knowledge and resources. Diversification is also a strategy for firms to pursue 
future competitive advantage. This forward-looking view of diversification receives less 
attention in research, and is only supported by anecdotal, case-based or conceptual research. 
Walter and Barney (1990) collected data from 32 professional merger and acquisition 
intermediaries. They found that expanding into new types of markets or products provides 
another major motivation for firm to diversify. This perspective is echoed by Ansoff (1965) 
and Reed and Luffman (1986), who argue firms diversify for both proactive and defensive 
reasons. By entering new product or markets through diversification, firm proactively search 
for new knowledge and skills to enhance their competitive advantage. Strategic management 
literature supporting this forward-looking view of diversification will be further discussed in 
this chapter.  
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   Table 2.1  Categories of Diversification Motives 
Correct past mistakes  Improve current efficiency  Build future capability
 
• Escape from 
declining market 
• Poor 
organizational 
performance 
 
• Financial risk reduction
• Managerial motivation 
• Market Power 
• Resource sharing 
• Good organizational 
performance 
 
 
• Entering new 
markets 
• Introducing new 
products 
 
Diversification Direction 
 
While the perspectives discussed above help explain why firms diversify, many of 
them are not clear about where firms diversify: the specific product-market a firm is likely to 
enter. For example, the “defensive diversification” argument suggests that a firm will enter 
other businesses when its current business is maturing and declining. But this explanation 
does not define which business the firm is likely to diversify into to enhance survival. 
Similarly, agency argument only predicts firm tend to diversify beyond the efficiency level, 
but cannot resolve the question of the direction of firm expansion. Among the above 
perspectives, resource-based view is an exception because it not only capable of explaining 
the motivation of firm diversification, but also provides important insights into the direction 
of firm diversification.  
Resource-based view argues firms diversify to leverage their underutilized resources. 
While excess resources provide motivation for diversification, they differ in their 
transferability. For example, financial resources are more flexible than other type of 
resources so they can be easily transferred and put into use in many different contexts 
(Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). On the other hand, tangible resources such as the plant and 
equipment may be less flexible and can only be used for very closely related products 
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(Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). Similarly, intangible resources such as brand names and 
innovative capability, are found to be less transferable, and better to be used to enter related 
markets (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Bettis, 1981). Because it is assumed that firms will 
diversify in ways that maximize profits, the resource-based view suggest firms will diversify 
in accordance with their existing resource profile, and to areas where they might best 
leverage their resources. Overall, studies adopting the resource-based view found that firms 
tend to diversify into areas that require a similar resource profile as their core business 
(Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). For instance, firms operating in advertising or research-
intensive industries diversify into industries have high research or advertising intensity 
(Montgomery & Hariharan, 1990; Lecraw, 1984, Bettis, 1981; Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 
1991).  
The resource-based view sheds light on firm diversification direction based on the 
internal aspect of firm. However, we should also consider the influence of external 
environment on firm’s diversification decision. For example, I/O economist would argue that 
firms will enter markets that provide greater profitability, if they could (Bain, 1956). Such 
markets share some common structural attributes such as low concentration, low competition, 
high growth, etc. In the organizational theory literature, ecological theory also highlighted 
the role of competition in firm market entry. Although focusing on population founding and 
disbanding, population ecology does provide implications on firm market entry decision. One 
of the major models developed by ecological theory is density dependence, which indicates 
organizational founding rate will have an inversed U-shape relationship with population 
density (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). The reason is that organizational founding rate rise 
initially because of the legitimation effect, and later drop because of the competition effect. 
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Because firm market entry is similar to organizational founding (Haveman, 1993), studies 
have found that firm market entry also follows an inversed-U relationship with population 
density (Havemean, 1993; Greve, 2000). To ecological theorists, “population density” is a 
concept almost identical to what I/O economists call “industry competition”.  One difference 
is that density to ecologists not only captures competition, but also represents legitimacy. As 
organizations avoid markets with intense competition (high density), they will also reluctant 
to enter markets with little legitimacy (low density). The important insight from ecological 
theory on diversification strategy is that firm diversification decision is not only an economic 
process, but also a social process. Ecological theory suggests that firm diversification choice 
may not follow the economic model of perfect rationality and profit maximization (Haveman, 
1993).  
The legitimation process described by density dependence model builds on 
institutional theory (Meyer & Rowman, 1977; Scott & Meyer, 1983), which argues 
organizations tend to conform to norms and social expectations in the institutional 
environment in order to improve their chance of survival. New markets lack cognitive and 
social political legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) so firms usually have greater difficulty and 
face greater risk to fail in these markets. When uncertainty is high and legitimacy is low, 
organizations will choose to imitate other firms when making strategic decisions, using 
institutional rules instead of technical rules (Meyer, Scott & Deal, 1983). This process is 
called mimetic isomorphism and it is not a homogenous process (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Organizations do not imitate all organizations equally. Their imitation has been found to be 
driven by two conditions: observability and relevance (Greve, 1998). Large and successful 
firms usually have greater observabitility. At the same time, the strategy of large and 
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successful firms might also being perceived as more legitimate. So they are more likely to be 
imitated by other firms. Observability might also be higher for firms that are approximate to 
local firms. Relevance is higher for firms that are similar to focal firms in terms of size or 
strategic context.  Following this stream of literature, a number of studies have found that 
firms’ market entry choices will follow similar and successful organizations (Haveman, 1993; 
Greve, 1998; 2000) 
The perspectives reviewed above can be compared on two dimensions. The first 
dimension is the rationality in decision-making. Resource-based view and I/O economics 
both view decision makers as rational calculators. Firm decision makers evaluate their 
internal resources and external environment, finding the right fit (Hitt & Tyler, 1991). In 
contrast, ecological and institutional theory argues the decision to diversify is not guided by a 
calculating rationality. Under uncertainty, firms have to rely on cognitive simplifications in 
their decision-making (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Daft & Weick, 1984). Under the regime of 
bounded rationality, organizations might not be able to find the optimal strategy because 
“managers operate in a world that is socially constructed” (Fligstein & Dauber, 1989)”.  
The second comparative dimension relates to the differences in the causal imperatives 
implied across the perspectives. While the resource-based theory views diversification 
strategy as driven by firm internal resources, the I/O economic, ecological and institutional 
theories believe firm strategy is shaped by firm environment. 
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Figure 2.1  A Comparison of Diversification Perspectives 
 
 
Summary: In sum, research examining diversification has a long history. The primary 
focus since Rumelt (1974) has been on the performance outcome of diversification 
relatedness. Yet the findings yielded have been equivocal, which might be traced to three 
main weaknesses in previous diversification research. 
First, previous studies tend to only focus on the rearward looking perspectives for 
explaining diversification. The perspectives adopted in previous literature mainly view 
diversification as a means to correct past mistake or improve current operations (Karim & 
Mitchell, 2000). Guided by this view, the benefit of relatedness was emphasized because 
relatedness is believed to be the necessary condition to achieve synergy. What is missing in 
diversification literature is a forward-looking view. Firms also need to prepare for the future, 
which is particularly importance in a changing environment where old competence obsoletes 
quickly.  A forward-looking perspective is especially necessary in the study of 
entrepreneurial ventures. These nascent firms lack experience, and have limited resources, 
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leading to a need to learn and build. If the purpose of diversification is not to leverage 
existing competence but to build new competence, then the relationship between relatedness 
and diversification deserves further investigation.  
 Secondly, previous studies typically focused on large and mature firms. The seminal 
study by Rumelt (1974) and a series of follow up studies (e.g. Bettis, 1981; Christensen & 
Montgomery, 1981; Bettis & Hall, 1982; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1986; Rumelt, 1982) all 
examined fortune 500 or fortune 1000 firms. Most studies use publicly listed companies. 
This approach picks only the survivors and might lead to serious biases (Heckman, 1979), 
because publicly traded firms only account for less than one-half of one percent of all 
corporations (Aldrich, 1999).   Those firms that didn’t succeed or become large enough to 
make to the list are ignored, although they might also attempt to diversify. The omission of 
small and new firms might be another cause of the weak results in diversification research 
since large and old firms might have reached the threshold of the benefits of diversification. 
Finally, most studies devote their attention to the linkage between diversification 
strategy and performance, yet few have looked at the mechanisms behind the choice of 
diversification (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990).  Insights into how diversification strategy is chosen 
will improve our understanding of diversification-performance linkage. This is because 
diversification strategy is not an exogenous variable. It is an endogenous choice influenced 
by a variety of factors. The external influence of industry has received some attention 
(Sharma & Kesner, 1996; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997; Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; 
Haveman, 1993), but mainly from economics perspective. The internal influence also has 
been studied (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Silverman, 1999; Chang, 1996), but only 
independently. What is missing is the type of research that integrates multiple perspectives, 
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and combines both the internal and external influences. This type of research will 
significantly contribute to our understanding of diversification phenomena. 
Above I have reviewed the literature on diversification in general. In the next section, 
I will review the literature on new venture diversification in specific. Special attention will be 
given to the applicability of existing diversification theory in the context of new ventures.  
 
New Venture Diversification 
 
Although diversification has been studied extensively in economics, organizational 
theory and strategic management, new venture diversification has received less attention. 
This omission is surprising because many entrepreneurial ventures actually operate 
diversified businesses or plan to do so (Lynn & Reinsh, 1990). Diversification and 
entrepreneurship have a natural connection as both facilitate growth. Since the initial works 
of Penrose (1959) and Ansoff (1965), diversification has been suggested as a natural outcome 
in the process of organizational growth. Ansoff (1965) even called his matrix of 
diversification strategy “growth vectors”. Similarly, growth distinguishes the entrepreneurial 
form of business (Sexton & Smilor, 2000). In order to grow, new ventures must develop a 
diverse portfolio of assets and activities (Bhide, 2000). As  “a single product rarely makes a 
successful company” (Packard, 1996), entrepreneurial ventures usually expand their business 
through diversifying products.  
A small number of studies examined the diversification phenomena in small firms. 
This literature will be reviewed first. There are also studies that do not directly examine the 
issue of diversification, but have implications on new venture diversification. I will also 
review this literature. Then I will compare the findings from these studies to the findings 
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from large firm diversification, exploring the applicability of existing diversification theories 
to new ventures. 
 
New venture diversification, causes and effects 
 
Studies that directly examine new venture diversification are scarce and mainly focus 
on small businesses. In a survey study of small community banks, Silverman and Castaldi 
(1992) examined the factors that influence the CEO’s intention to diversify. They found CEO 
perceptions of competitive intensity, changes in customer preferences, firm size and variation 
in profitability all increase firm propensity to diversify. Another study by Lynn and Reinsch 
(1990) explored the purpose, relatedness and effects of diversification in small businesses. 
They found financial growth is the major reason for diversification for small business owners. 
Interestingly, the leverage of existing resources was not found as a major motivation to 
diversify, and small business owners tend to operate less related business. The only resources 
frequently shared are accounting and consulting services. Technology and marketing 
resources are rarely shared. When combining diversification strategy with owner satisfaction 
(satisfaction was used as the measure of diversification performance), the authors found that 
related diversification led to short-term satisfaction, but in the long run, became 
disappointing. On the contrary, less related diversification appears difficult at first, but 
proves more rewarding in the long run.  
A better-developed stream of literature examines the breadth of new venture product 
strategy. This line of literature originates from Porter (1980)’s generic strategy model, and 
the generalist vs. specialist typology in ecological theory (Brittan & Freeman, 1980). This 
vein of research suggests small new ventures should use specialist strategy and focus on 
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niche markets (Carroll, 1985). The reason is that new firms lack resources to compete with 
larger and more established competitors. Specialization can help new firms to gain a foothold 
with relative fewer resources. The way “generalism” is operationalized is analogous to 
product diversification (Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991). While breadth is only a coarse 
measure of the degree of diversification, the basic ideas do provide a traditional perspective 
on patterns of diversification in new ventures. 
 The most influential empirical work examining new venture product strategy is 
Biggadike (1979), who investigated the entry strategies of corporate ventures and their 
impacts on venture performance. Although he didn’t directly study product diversification 
strategy, he examined the product line breadth of new ventures and found entrants with 
broader product lines have superior financial and market performance. This finding is 
contradictory to the conventional wisdom of earlier entrepreneurship literature, which 
suggests new ventures should concentrate on a narrow niche (Hosmer, 1957; Porter, 1980; 
Carroll, 1985). Although the author didn’t provide a theoretical explanation for his finding, 
he suggested that firms with a broader product line can obtain a higher relative size, which 
helps lower cost and improve financial performance. Similar results were found in later 
studies of independent ventures (e.g. Sandberg & Hofer, 1987; Miller & Camp, 1985; 
McCann, 1991).  
Other researchers argue that the effectiveness of venture strategy is contingent on 
specific industry conditions. A broader product strategy might be more appropriate when 
market demand is increasing and competitive concentration is declining because the 
expanding environment provides richer resources for new ventures to exploit (Romanelli, 
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1989). A study by McDougall and colleagues (1994) supports this view, in finding that new 
ventures with broader strategies have higher sales growth rates in higher growth industries.  
 
Summary: Although the literature on new venture diversification is not abundant, it 
has several important implications. First, the diversification pattern of new ventures might 
not be the same as large and mature organizations. Based on the logic of mainstream 
diversification literature, new ventures should enter related business because their limited 
resource will constrain their ability to diversify. Opposite to this common belief, small firms 
were found to diversify into less related areas. This surprising finding suggests the existing 
theory on diversification might need to be extended and improved. 
 Secondly, new ventures seem to embrace a forward-looking perspective of 
diversification, rather than a rearward-looking perspective. They view growth as the single 
most important reason to diversify. They also diversify to meet the changes in the 
environment such as customer needs. The use of current resources seems not to be a major 
concern in their diversification. This might because they have not yet generated a large 
amount of excess resources. 
 The differences in the findings question the applicability of existing diversification 
theory to new ventures. Basic assumptions grounding existing diversification theories such as 
the resource leverage argument may not fit all contexts. New ventures and established firm 
might have fundamental differences. New ventures are not a “little” established firms. 
 
The differences between new ventures and established firms  
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New ventures and established firms differ in many dimensions. New ventures have 
lower level of structural inertia than established firms. New ventures also have less resources 
and competences than established firms. The decision-making in new ventures is less formal. 
In sum, these differences influence the diversification choices that new firms make. In 
following sections, I will discuss each of these dimensions in greater detail.  
 
Flexibility  
 
Organizational theorists use age and size to distinguish new ventures from established 
firms. Age and size are two important organizational characteristics that strongly affect 
organizational behavior. According to ecological theory, organizations develop structural 
inertia due to pressures for reliability and accountability (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
Although inertia helps the firm avoid continuous change response to random environmental 
events, it also inhibits organizational change. Organizational learning theory explains how 
inertia develops in organizations. As organizations learn from experience, they tend to fall 
into competence traps because favorable experience are emphasized and reinforced (Levitt & 
March, 1988; Levinthal & March, 1993). These experiences create strong path dependency, 
and increase the opportunity cost for organizations to shift to new ideas and technologies. 
Learning that accumulate with experience thus generates inertia and makes organizations 
difficult to change.  
Although organizations are difficult to change, not all changes are equivalent. 
Organization structure can be separated into layers and flexibility varies across layers. 
Organizational goals, forms of authority, core technology and marketing strategy form the 
core of organizations and are less malleable (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Elements at the 
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periphery of the structure are relatively more flexible. Diversifications frequently are core 
organizational changes because they result in new products or services, new customers and 
sometimes new technologies (Haveman, 1993; Fligstein & Dauber, 1989).  
Similarly, diversification types also differ in terms of the degree of change required. 
Related diversification builds on existing technology or market bases, and requires few 
changes to organizational features. A good example of related product diversification could 
be Amgen’s product extensions in the treatment of anemia. The initial product EPOGEN and 
the following product Aranesp work in a similar way mimic the body’s natural erythropoietin 
to stimulate red blood cell production. Both drugs are recombinant erythropoietin, only a bit 
different in their molecularstructure. Aranesp is more advanced than EPOGEN in that it acts 
longer and is more active.  Other types of diversification, though, bring greater changes to the 
organization. For example, product-line additions involve more substantial changes. A 
pharmaceutical firm often has varied product-lines that include various drugs targeting 
different patient groups, in different forms and based on different technologies. Amgen 
currently has eight FDA approved products that treats nine different disease conditions.  
Besides varying across aspects of structure, the strength of inertial force may also 
vary with firm age and size. New organizations usually exhibit less inertia than old 
organizations because they have fewer and younger routines, with less reproducibility, 
reliability and accountability (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Younger firms have been found to 
be more flexible and open to change (Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991).  
Organizational size also increases firm structural inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Large 
firms require more complex structure and more bureaucracy (Haveman, 1993b). 
Bureaucratization increases organizational formalization, layers of decision-making authority, 
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and isolation of organization members’ effort and the performance result. The size induced 
structural differentiation increases the difficulty of learning, and decreases the speed of 
response to change. Overall, organizational theory suggests new ventures are less inert and 
more flexible than established firms. New ventures change early and faster than established 
firms. They are also more proactive in response to external environments (Chen & Hambrick, 
1995; Dean, Brown & Bamford, 1998).  
 
Resources and competence 
 
New ventures and established firms also differ in their resources and competences. 
The strategic management perspective views organizations as bundles of routines and 
resources. Among resources, knowledge is the most important one as knowledge forms the 
firm’s distinctive competences (Teece, Pisano & Chuen, 1990). This knowledge is imbedded 
in organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), which take time to develop and replicate 
efficiently. Older organizations may be more efficient than younger firms because they 
practice these routines more and accumulated more experience (Stinchcome, 1965). 
According to organizational learning theory, experience with a set of organizational routines 
enhances organizational competence (March, 1991) 
The advantage in resources and competences owned by established firms can be 
reflected in four ways. First, established firms have more financial resources so they can 
afford a wider range of competitive actions. Secondly, established firms have brand 
recognition and legitimacy, while new ventures have to create these attributes (Aldrich & 
Foil, 1994). Thirdly, established firms have distribution channels and customer relations to 
commercialize products. These complementary assets (Teece, 1986) are difficult to replicate 
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quickly, yet critical for successful market entry (Mitchell, 1991). Finally, established firms 
have greater knowledge and competence. They tend to have more skillful employees with 
more firm-specific knowledge (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). From their past interaction with 
the environment, they have a better understanding of how things work and what strategies 
should be effective.  
 
Decision-making 
 
Another difference between new ventures and established firms lies in their decision-
making process. First, new ventures often have highly centralized decision-making systems. 
The decision-making process is typically dominated by the entrepreneur (Charan, Hofer & 
Mahon, 1980). On the other hand, managers in established firms are relatively constrained by 
organizational systems. This is why leadership in small firms usually has a greater influence 
on firm strategy than leadership in established firms (Daily, McDougall, Covin & Dalton, 
2002). 
More importantly, new ventures tend to rely less on analytical tools and more on 
entrepreneurs’ intuitions in the decision-making process. New venture decision-making is 
less comprehensive, and fewer alternatives are taken into consideration (Miller & Friesen, 
1984). Established firms are more likely to use formal methods of data collection (Mohan-
Neill, 1995) and formal analytic and planning techniques (Miller & Friesen, 1984) 
The different decision making process suggests new ventures are subject to greater 
likelihood of decision biases and heuristics (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). This is because 
managers in established organizations often have historical data and decision-making 
“routines” to simplify decision-making, a source not available to entrepreneurs. New 
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ventures usually face a more uncertain and complex decision-making context than 
established organizations (Covin & Slevin, 1991). The use of heuristics helps entrepreneurs 
to deal with decision complexity (Walsh, 1995). 
One of the most distinctive biases in new ventures is overconfidence. When 
evaluating new business opportunities, entrepreneurs may overestimate the possible synergy 
between new and old business or be overly optimistic about their ability to manage a 
business that they have little knowledge about. Thus overconfidence might lead 
entrepreneurs to enter unrelated business. Alternatively, overconfidence about their initial 
strategy may lead entrepreneurs to neglect failure and over sample success. This indicates 
overconfidence might also make entrepreneurs to persist their early strategy and enter related 
areas. Another decision bias often found among entrepreneurs is representativeness, which 
refers to the tendency to generalize based on only a few observations (Bazerman, 1990). This 
suggests entrepreneurs might generalize their own success across other opportunities, or 
make conclusions based on limited evidence.   
 
Summary: Prevalent evidences suggest that new ventures are different from 
established firms. However, diversification researchers have often ignored this difference and 
conducted studies based solely established firms, or combined new and established firms 
without making clear distinctions. To fill this gap, the next chapter sets out to develop an 
integrated model of new venture diversification. This model will take the distinctions 
between new ventures and established firm into account, theorizing and testing the 
differences in their diversification behavior. Moreover, the model will incorporate a forward-
looking perspective of diversification, and integrate insights from internal (resources and 
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routines) and external (environment) views of the firm. The theoretical foundation of this 
study is learning and evolutionary theory, which will be introduced in the next section  
 
A Learning and Evolutionary Perspective of Diversification 
 
The learning and evolutionary perspective combines two approaches. One is Nelson 
and Winter (1982)’s evolutionary economics, which examine organizational learning from 
economics perspective, focusing on economic and technological development. Another is the 
work by March and his colleagues (Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988; March, 
1991; Levithal & March, 1993), which studies organizational by focusing on the behavioral 
nature of learning. Although these two approaches are distinct from each other, they share 
common ground (Pennings, Barkema & Douma, 1994). For example, both approaches use 
routines as the basic unit of analysis. They also build on same assumptions of bounded 
rationality and satisficing behavior. Moreover, both emphasize search as a major source of 
organizational change.  Finally, both approaches discuss selection processes, though 
organizational learning emphasizes internal selection, while evolutionary economic theory 
views the environment as the ultimate selection mechanism. I integrate these two approaches 
because organizational learning theories provide a micro theoretical foundation (that is, a 
focus on how learning takes place), and the evolutionary economics shed light on 
diversification strategy (that is, why a learned approach might or might not create enduring 
profits). In the following section, I will discuss the integration of these perspectives in detail.  
Routines 
 
The learning and evolutionary perspective on strategy theorized that tacit resources 
such as organizational knowledge reside in an organization’s routines (Cyert & March, 1963; 
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Nelson & Winter, 1982). Routines are rules, procedures, conventions, strategies and 
technologies that constrict organizations and guide their operations (Levitt & March, 1988). 
Organizations develop, stabilize and follow routines. In the evolutionary theory of 
organizations, routines play the role that genes play in biological theory. For organizational 
learning theorists, routines store firm knowledge and guide firm behavior. Product-lines in a 
firm could be measures of organizational routines because each product-line represents a 
firm’s technology, market and operational knowledge in a particular product. A firm 
producing two different product lines uses two sets of routines that might have some overlap, 
yet are distinct from each other (Karim & Mitchell, 2000).  
 
Search and Selection 
 
Search is a core concept in learning and evolutionary theory. In the behavioral theory 
of the firm (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963), search is an activity of the 
organization to solve problems. With a certain goal in mind, the organization searches for 
possible solutions and made final choices based on these solutions. Selection happens when 
managers compare the alternatives generated from organizational search, and select the ones 
that meet their targets. Search is a major part of the organizational learning process (Huber, 
1991) and has three characteristics: first, search is problem-oriented; second, search is simple 
minded and third, search is biased. Cyert and March (1963) suggested that organizations 
search in the neighborhood of the problem symptom and in the neighborhood of the current 
alternative. Furthermore, organization search is biased toward the special experience and 
expectations of the organization.  
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Evolutionary theory argues firms engage in a continuous search and selection process 
to upgrade technological and organizational knowledge, and thereby improve performance 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). Organizational search include activities that are associated with 
discovering, considering and evaluating routines. The selection process determines 
organizational expansion or contraction. Similar to mutation in biological evolutionary 
theory, search is a routine-guided, routine-changing process (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
Organizations engage in a variety of searches including search for new technology, 
new production methods or superior organizational structure. In this study, I focus on firms’ 
search for new product-market. Diversifications into new product-markets, which change the 
firm’s scope and collection of routines, can be viewed as a form search and selection that 
seek to upgrade the firm’s knowledge base and meet demands in the competitive 
environment (Chang, 1996). This provides a forward-looking view of diversification. From 
learning and evolutionary perspective, diversification is a process to acquire new routines, 
modify current ones and make new combinations. Through diversification, firms can update 
their existing capabilities or create new capabilities to meet the challenge of a dynamic 
environment. 
 
Attention in the search and selection process 
 
Learning and evolutionary theory suggests search and selection may not be guided by 
rational decision-making processes. Organizations search and select the satisfactory solution, 
which is not necessarily the optimal one. The process of search and selection is affected by 
the cognitive constraints of the decision maker as well as the constraints of existing firm 
routines. This is because firm will only attend to solutions that they deem appropriate. This 
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attention is likely to be shaped by firm past experience and external environment. For 
example, firms might search options that are readily available or have been directed at 
similar problems in the past (Cyert & March, 1963). They might select solutions that have 
been adopted by other firms that they view similar to themselves (Greve, 1998). To 
understand the search and selection of product-market, it is important to understand the how 
firms’ attention is shaped.  
 Levinthal and March (1993) pointed out three possible biases in organizational 
learning. First is the temporal myopia. Organizations tend to attend to short-term problems 
and overlook distant times. This will lead to the selection of solutions that improve short-
term efficiency at sacrifice of long-term survival. Second is the spatial myopia, organizations 
pay greater attention to effects that occur near to them. For example, organizations only 
search in the vicinity of the problem symptom. They may only observe the behavior of other 
organizations that are close to them (Greve, 1998; Baum, Li & Usher, 2000). Lastly, 
organizations reinforce success and under sample failure. The result is a greater tendency to 
repeat the solutions that has been successful in the past. From this perspective, then, 
diversification breadth will be highly constrained.   
 The issue of bounded rationality in the search process suggests the search for new 
product is also not a pure rational decision. Rather than examining all the possible new 
product-markets and picking the one optimal to firm performance, cognitive limits determine 
firms will only diversify into areas they paid attention to. So to understand the direction of 
diversification, we must study firm cognitive process and how it influence learning. 
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Experience and local search 
 
Much of organizational knowledge is acquired through direct experience. By 
repetitions of the same practice, organizations often improve their competence in performing 
that practice. This is learning by doing, known as the learning curve (Yelle, 1979). Such 
experiential-based knowledge often becomes an important competitive advantage for a firm. 
Strategic management researchers often call this the  “core competence” (Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990).  
  Within an experiential learning framework, organizational search could be 
conceptualized the allocation of attention and resources between exploring new routines and 
exploiting existing routines (March, 1991). Exploration of new routines reduces the 
opportunity to improve the competence of existing routines. Yet a singular focus on 
refinement of existing routines will be dangerous for firm long-term survival as this can lead 
to obsolescence. So learning theory suggests organizations should strike a balance between 
exploration and exploitation (March, 1991).   
Although organizations can fall into either excessive exploration or excessive 
exploitation, the later is more common in organizations (Levinthal & March, 1993). The 
exploitation of existing knowledge often drives out exploration for novel and distant 
knowledge. So firms tend to conduct local search, in the neighborhood of routines that have 
evolved in an organization.  
There are several explanations for local search. First, decision makers have limited 
cognitive capability and cannot consider all the alternatives. Naturally, the firm’s past actions 
become the most available sources of solutions and the starting points for new searches 
(March, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Secondly, organizations attend to short-term rewards 
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rather than long-term returns. Exploiting existing routines bring more certain and closer 
returns than exploration (March, 1991). In contrast, exploration with new routines is risky 
and might lead to poor short-term results because firm is less familiar with them. So 
organizations tend to search locally rather than distantly. Finally, experiential learning could 
cause strong path-dependence (Levitt & March, 1988). This is because what an organization 
learned past periods would have a strong effect on what it is able to learn in the current 
period. Learning is cumulative, and previous knowledge stocks determine the “absorptive 
capacity” of the firm to accept new knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1996). The more an 
organization is competent at a particular routine, the greater likelihood they will engage in 
that routine more often. This is called the “competency trap” (Levitt & March, 1988), or 
“core-rigidity” (Leonard-Barton, 1992).  
Local search has been found across many different contexts. Martin and Michell 
(1998) studied the influence of local search on new product design introductions. Rosenkopf 
and Nerkar (2001), Stuart and Podolny (1996), Katila and Ahuja (2002) examined local 
search in technologic choices. Other contexts include organizational change (Amburgy, Kelly 
& Barnett, 1993; Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991), mergers and acquisitions (Amburgey & 
Miner, 1992; Ginsberg & Baum, 1994), branch locations (Greve, 2000; Baum, Li & Usher, 
2000) and foreign market entry (Mitchell, Shaver & Yeung, 1994).  
Diversification as an organizational learning process is also constrained by local 
search. First, because firm exploitation drives out exploration, organizations build on existing 
routines. In terms of the product-market choice, firms will select a new product-market that is 
close and relate to their current ones, so that the routines in current product-markets can be 
leveraged and reused. Secondly, because of the path-dependency of learning, organizations 
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tend to maintain the direction and emphasis of their prior choices. This organizational 
momentum also applies to firm diversification. Past diversification strategies will be repeated 
in the next round. Chang (1996) confirmed the relationship between local search and 
diversification. 
 
Experience and Distant search  
 
Although local search is prevalent, recent literature, has stressed that firms can move 
beyond local search and to reconfigure knowledge. A number of studies have adopted distant 
search perspective to study corporate acquisition (e.g. Capron, Mitchell & Swaminathan, 
2001; Ranft, 1997; Karim & Mitchell, 2000). These studies view acquisitions as a means by 
which firms gain new resources and reconfigure their resource profile. Through acquisition, 
firms overcome constraints of existing routines, and drive the creation, evolution and 
recombination of routines into new source of competitive advantage (Eisenhart & Martin, 
2000). In this study, I extend this perspective to product level diversification. Similar to 
acquisition, diversification is used by firms to gain new resources and routines. The 
difference is that diversification can be achieved through either acquisition or internal 
development. Although diversification mode is beyond the scope of this study, this study 
extends previous work by investigating how internal resources lead to the reconfiguration of 
routines. 
The routines by which firm achieve new resource configurations is called “dynamic 
capability” (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). The creation of new configurations is viewed as 
a second-order competence because rests on the firm’s ability to create new knowledge 
through recombination of knowledge elements. Kogut and Zander (1992) call this second-
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order competence ‘combinative capabilities’ and suggest the key is to synthesize existing 
knowledge with knowledge acquired externally. Henderson and Cockurn (1994) define this 
second-order competence as architectural competence. They argue two types of 
knowledge/experience might contribute to architectural competence. The first is the ability to 
access knowledge from outside the boundaries of the organization; the second is the ability to 
integrate knowledge across internal organizational boundaries. Many recent studies suggest 
using alliances or acquisitions are keys to move away from local search (Stuart & Podolny, 
1996; Nagarajan & Mitchell, 1998). The common theme of these researches is that second-
order competence requires organizations to span internal or external boundaries to acquire 
and recombines knowledge. 
The logic of acquisition and recombination implies that firms have the ability to do so, 
which in turn requires that firm have accumulated experience.  In order to acquire new 
knowledge, a firm must have the “absorptive capacity” (Cohen & Levintal, 1990), which 
increases with internal research and production experience. Therefore, the accumulation of 
experience might not invariably lead to path-dependency, but might provide a foundation for 
path-breaking change. To recombine and create new linkages, there must be enough 
knowledge elements to use as raw material. The integrate different knowledge streams 
demand not only the ability to access to a diverse knowledge bases, but also the ability to 
make novel linkages. Again organizations must accumulate experience in order to form the 
knowledge base for recombination to happen. Overall, firm experience plays a central role in 
the process of distant search.  
Summary: The learning and evolutionary perspective provides a framework for 
understanding the direction of firm diversification. The perspective integrates the two forces 
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(firm internal experience and external market experience) that drive the direction of 
diversification into a coherent picture, and provides a forward-looking logic for 
diversification. Organization learning and search can be local and incremental, or distant and 
radical. The logic of diversification can be based either on leveraging exiting knowledge and 
resources, or gaining new knowledge and resources.  
Experience plays a critical role is the process of search and learning. It can be the 
source of local search and path-dependency as well as the basis for distant search and path-
breaking change. The way to reconcile these two different forms of learning (and different 
views on diversification) is to bring organizational features into the analysis. Since learning 
is bounded rational, the way organizations interpret and direct their attention will greatly 
affect the results of learning. Early and mature stage organizations might have different 
interpretation and attention patterns based on their past experience. In the next chapter, I will 
integrate these perspectives and present how organizational stages might affect the process of 
learning and new product-market diversification.  
  
 
CHAPTER THREE: MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Chapter one provided an overview of the research issue and the general model, and 
offered three specific research questions. 
1. How do market and technology experience affect new and mature organizations’ 
product-market choices?  
2. How does experience affect firm choices over time? Does experience affect new 
ventures and established firms in different ways? 
3. How do certain organizational features affect firm product-market choices? 
Chapter two reviewed literature examining diversifications. This literature helps 
establish the domain of interest of this dissertation. Chapter Two also reviewed the literature 
on new venture diversification and literature in organizational theory that focuses on the 
differences between new ventures and established firms.  This literature provides insights 
into the unique dimensions of new venture diversification.  
To explain the choice of diversification strategy, we need a theory of organizational 
action that takes into account the varying kind of factors that influence the product-market 
entry decision. At the end of chapter two, I presented a review of organizational learning and 
evolutionary theory, which provides the conceptual foundations for the model developed in 
this chapter. In this chapter I will relate learning theory to organizational theory and develop 
hypotheses on how organizational characteristics interact with experience to influence new 
product-market entries. 
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A Model of Firm Product-market Entry 
 
If we view a firm as a collection of resources and competences (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen, 1990), then each product-line is an accumulation of knowledge and routines 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). The evolutionary and learning perspective suggests organizations 
continuously search for new knowledge to improve performance (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Cyert & March, 1963) and firm diversification is part of the search process (Chang, 1996; 
Karim & Mitchell, 2000).  As a firm introduces a new product, the new product might build 
on the familiar knowledge and routines of legacy products, or bring new knowledge and 
routines to the firm.  In this study, I adopt this evolutionary and learning perspective and 
examine diversification as an organization search and learning process that aims to upgrade 
the firm’s current knowledge base.  
In chapter two, I briefly presented the learning and evolutionary perspective on 
diversification. In this section, I am going to apply this framework to explain the choice of 
new product-markets. As I have reviewed in the literature review chapter, literature suggests 
two types of search in the firm’s diversification process. First, local search is common and 
will lead organizations to enter product-markets that relate to their past experience. Because 
experience reduces uncertainty and provides incentive for repetition, firms tend to specialize 
in areas of their experience and choose related product-markets for diversification. This 
perspective is dominant in the literature and it provides logic for my main hypotheses, which 
argues that the direction of diversification is influenced by past experience.  
The second perspective suggests distant search is possible and firms may also enter 
product-markets that they know little about.  It argues experience, as the basis for knowledge 
acquisition and recombination, might lead organizations to explore new knowledge and enter 
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less related product-markets. This perspective provides insights to my examination of 
organizational stages and features that might moderate the relationship between experience 
and diversification. 
The two perspectives indicate both local search and distant search might exist in an 
organization. The core research interest of this dissertation is to understand the condition and 
context under which each type of search happens, which forms my research model (See 
figure 3.1).  In my research model, the main hypothesis argues organizations will enter 
product-market that they have experience with. However, this process will be moderated by 
firm stages since new and established organizations might have different patterns of search 
and diversification. In addition, organizational knowledge structures might also moderate the 
relationship between experience and diversification. Organizations with broader and 
innovative knowledge might be able to avoid the trap of experience and explore distant 
product-markets.  
In the following sections, I will first relate experiential learning to organizational 
cognition and discuss how organizational characteristics might influence learning processes. 
Building on this theoretical foundation, hypotheses and their arguments are presented next. 
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Figure 3.1  The General Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognition and Learning 
Learning from experience requires an organization to fully attend to the past 
experience, and understand the cause and effect between experience and performance. 
However, learning is rarely a rational process and the cognitive limits of organizations might 
constrain learning (Levinthal & March, 1993). In organizations, at least three barriers of 
learning exist that are caused by cognitive limitations.  
First is the interpretation of experience. This refers to the difficulty in untangling the 
causality between action and outcome. Since organizations face complex and ever changing 
environments, the task to identify the right experience to learn is not always successful.  The 
difficulty in interpreting experience increases with organizational size and complexity 
(Dobrev, Kim & Carroll, 2003). Large organizations with many people and subunits make 
the relationship between action and results more complex to understand. This will increase 
the difficulty of mature organizations in interpreting their experience and learning from their 
experience.  
Firm Experience 
Technology 
Market 
New Product-market Entry
Technology 
Market 
Organizational Features: 
Knowledge Breadth 
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Secondly, cognitive limits lead to attention to certain experience and to neglect of 
others. Individuals have biases in their decision-making. They attend to events that fit into 
their mental models (Prahalad & Bettis, 1996). They direct their attention to recent and 
salient events and use simple linear functions to explain causality (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979).  This is why learning is myopic, as organizations tend to overlook distant time and 
places, and overlook failures (Levinthal & March, 1993).  Since new venture are subject to 
greater biases and heuristics in their decision-making (Busenitz & Barney, 1997), their 
experiential learning might be greatly influenced by individual attentions. Entrepreneurs tend 
to have strong mental models and to be overconfident about their strategies (Hayward, 
Shepherd & Griffin, 2006; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995).  Confidence in control over outcomes 
leads to learning from expectations rather than real consequences, and it makes the 
interpretation of results more favorable (March, Sproull & Tamuz, 1991). So early stage 
firms tend to persist in their initial strategy.  
Thirdly, experiential learning is affected by the memory of experience (Levitt & 
March, 1988). Experience as routine is assumed to be maintained and accumulated in the 
organization. However, the turnover of personnel and the passage of time might lead to loss 
of experiences.  As an organization ages, past experience may be lost because of the exit of 
organizational leaders who legitimize and socialize the routine, and the turnover of 
organizational members who possess the tacit knowledge of the routine.  
 These learning barriers suggest that learning is not a homogenous process across all 
organizations. Organizational characteristics determine the cognitive pattern of an 
organization, which in turn interacts with learning processes. Based on this idea, I will 
develop hypotheses that predict direction of firm new product-market entries by integrating 
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learning with organizational characteristics. In the next section, I will first explain the 
relationship between experience and diversification. Then I will discuss how organizational 
characteristics such as organizational stages and organizational knowledge structure can 
moderate the relationship between experience and product-market entry choices. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Experience and direction of firm new product-market entries 
 
Entering new product-markets requires the firm to have competences relating to 
technology and relating to customers (Danneels, 2002; Mitchell, 1992). Technology 
knowledge gives the firm the ability to design and manufacture a physical product with 
certain features. Market knowledge gives the firm the ability to serve certain customers. Both 
technology and market knowledge are necessary for a firm to provide a final product.  
Technology knowledge, which is about R&D and production, accumulates as a function of 
the firm’s technology experience. Market knowledge is positioned in the complementary 
assets (Teece, 1986) that improve the firm’s ability to market and distribute the new products. 
The examples of market knowledge include the understanding of customer needs, the 
distribution systems, and contacts and relations with customers. A firms’ market knowledge 
increases as firm gains greater experience with a market.  
A firm’s technology and market experience plays a central role in the selection of 
new product-markets. As we have reviewed in the last chapter, local search tends to dominate 
an organization’s learning process. The more certain rewards of exploiting knowledge 
learned in the past distract organizations from exploring novel routines. Competence building 
is facilitated by the firm’s exploitation of prior experience. This process, however, creates 
   
  47
barriers to learning new competence. When firms face the decision to select new product-
markets, they tend to follow past technology and market experiences. In another word, firms 
will enter new product-markets that require similar technology and customer base of their 
existing product-markets.  There are three reasons behind this argument. 
First, as noted earlier, decision makers have limited cognitive capability to consider 
all the alternatives. Naturally, what the firms have done in the past becomes the most 
available source of solutions and the starting points for new searches. The technology and 
market experience learned in the past is more likely to be the basis for new technology and 
market selection.  
Secondly, exploiting existing routines bring more certain and quicker returns than 
exploration. Entering a new product-market involves a great degree of uncertainty. If a firm 
enters a new product-market that they have experience in either the technology or market 
aspect, the risk and uncertainty will be reduced since old knowledge can be applied and 
reused.  
Finally, research has found that the early patterns of organization may have persistent 
impact on organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965; Boeker, 1989). The early experience will 
influence the skill set of the firm and the power distribution. For example, if a firm has 
experience in serving certain market, it has hired marketing and sales employees that have 
expertise in that market area. Also it had to built distribution channels and customer relations 
in that market. These tangible and intangible assets, once in place, will be reinforced because 
of the vested interests in the structure and power distribution. Research has shown that the 
necessity of serving exiting customers could hamper the ability of an organization to perceive 
and pursue new market opportunities (Rosenbloom & Christensen, 1994). 
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Based on these arguments, I hypothesize: 
H1a: Firms are more likely to enter product-markets that relate to their technology 
experience. 
H1b: Firms are more likely to enter product-markets that relate to their market 
experience. 
 
Organizational stages and experiential learning 
 
Although diversification as a general phenomenon has been found to be local and 
path-dependent, whether the effect is homogenous across all types of organizations remains 
an open question. New ventures and established firms might have different search and 
learning process, so their diversification pattern may also vary. There are two competing 
arguments about the diversification direction of new ventures and established firms. The first, 
and perhaps more dominant view argues older and more established firms are more likely to 
be constrained by their experience, so they are more likely to enter product-markets related to 
their past experience. The second perspective, on the contrary, suggests older firms have 
more resources and competences to diversify into less related markets. Bellow I will discuss 
each perspective in detail and present the two sets of competing hypotheses. 
Literature suggests established firms are more constrained by their experience than 
new ventures for three major reasons. First, established firms usually have practiced their 
routines for a longer period of time, so they have greater competence in performing their 
existing routines (Levitt & March, 1988).  According to the arguments of “competence trap” 
(Levitt & March, 1988; Levinthal & March, 1993), the increase in competence leads to 
successful outcomes. This motivates the organization to further repeat these routines. In 
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contrast, new ventures have very short existences so their routines have not been practiced as 
much. This means they have not gained much competence in these routines so they are less 
likely to repeat these routines. In another word, the path-dependency of learning is stronger 
in established firms than in new ventures. This suggests new ventures might not commit as 
fully to their existing routines as established firms. In the search for new product-markets, 
new ventures are less constrained by their existing experience, so they might search broader 
and more distant than established firms. 
Moreover, theories suggest new ventures have greater flexibility than established 
firms. Size and age all increase the structural inertia of a firm (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
Established firms have institutionalized their structures and routines. Overtime, interests and 
power vested in a certain course of action will prevent change. This also explains why 
established firms are less likely to choose novel routines (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Haveman, 
1993b). 
Finally, diversification might have a different meaning for new ventures, when 
compared to established firms. Established firms have built a strong competence and 
leveraging that competence to other areas could gain them scope economies. This is 
consistent with the resource-based theory that argues excess resources are the motivation to 
diversify. Because the goal is to exploit existing competence, firms will diversify into areas 
that are related in order to make sharing possible.  But for new ventures, their resources and 
competences might not be rich enough to leverage in other areas. Hence, new ventures’ 
motivation for diversification is to gain new knowledge and grasp new opportunities.  
New ventures start as blank sheets of paper. The entrepreneurs may not know ex ante 
which product will work. In this situation, learning theory suggests organizations engage in 
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trial-and-error learning until they find the satisfactory routine (Cyert & March, 1963; Staw, 
1977). This experimental process might allow greater search distance than path-dependence 
learning. New ventures may start with one product. If this product seems not very promising, 
new ventures will try out another product. Literature has suggested that one unique 
characteristic of entrepreneurship is that the cycle between action and feedback is shorter, so 
entrepreneurs have greater opportunity to learn (Sitkin, 1992). Through this experimentation 
process, firms learn about their environments and discern the most viable product-market 
position (Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2000).   
Overall, the unique features of new ventures suggest their diversification behavior 
should be different from established firms. New ventures are not constrained by existing 
competence, they are more flexible and tend to use diversification to experiment and learn. 
Based on these arguments, new venture seem less bounded by their past experience and are 
less likely to enter product-markets that are related to their existing product-markets. Thus I 
hypothesize: 
 
H2a: Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter product-
markets that relate to their technology experience. 
H2b: Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter product-
markets that relate to their market experience. 
 
The above hypothesis treats new ventures and established firms as two distinct states 
of organizations. Alternatively, we can treat organization development as continuous and use 
age as the indicator of the underlying growth process.  
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H3a: The older the firms, the more likely they will enter product-markets that relate 
to their technology experience. 
H3b: The older the firms, the more likely they will enter product-markets that relate 
to their market experience. 
 
Above I discussed the perspective that aging will bring greater tendency to follow 
past experience. This view parallels the “liability of aging”  (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Barron, 
West & Hannan, 1994) arguments in organizational ecology, which suggests aging is 
associated with greater rigidity, taken-for-granted understandings, and barriers to enter other 
niches. While this perspective is plausible, counter arguments also exist. Paralleling to the 
“liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965; Aldrich & Auster, 1986) argument, the second 
perspective suggests aging will improve the firm’s resources and position and will decrease 
the constraints of experience   There are three logics behind this view. 
First, established firms have longer histories of operations and have accumulated 
greater experience than new firms. They have more production experience, possess stronger 
relationships with customers and have a more experienced workforce (Stinchcombe, 1965).  
The richer experience of established firms contributes to exploration in two ways. Research 
have shown that the ability of an organization to recognize and assimilate new ideas depend 
on the level of knowledge accumulated within the organization (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Established firms with greater experience will have a stronger ability to embrace new 
solutions. This suggests they might have a greater likelihood of introducing products that 
require new technology or market knowledge.  Furthermore, established firms with more 
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experience tend to have greater competence, which will increase the organization reliability 
and efficiency (March, 1991). This is also why mature organizations have more resources 
and slack than new organizations. Slack resources act as buffers in an organization, and allow 
higher degree of exploration and experimentation to happen (Cyert & March, 1963).  Aligned 
with this view, studies have found that larger firms spend more on research and development 
(Cohen & Klepper, 1996) because they have greater incentive to do so.  
Secondly, established firms face greater difficulty in interpreting their experience 
because of their larger size and complex structure (Levinthal & March, 1993). This creates 
barriers for experiential learning. Organizations will only following past experience when 
they perceive it will bring more certain return than new routines. If they cannot correctly 
understand the relationship between past experience and performance, and perceive past 
experience as ineffective, they may discard that experience and try new routines instead. As 
the organization ages, its size and complexity increase geometrically. Both bureaucracy and 
institutionalization make it difficult to understand what happened and why.  Without quick 
and accurate feedback between action and performance, mature organizations may fail to 
learn and build on past experience. 
Finally, experience might get forgotten as the firm ages (Levitt & March, 1988). The 
effective learning demands proper recording, conservation and retrieval of experience.  
However, organizations may fail to record and retrieve properly. Because a large amount of 
experience is tacit knowledge, recording becomes difficult. In addition, tacit knowledge is 
imbedded in individuals, so conservation and retrieval also becomes challenging when 
organizations age and employees turnover. This problem will become particularly salient 
when organizational leadership changes. Dominant political coalitions inside the firm often 
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have strong incentive to insure firm focus on technology and market niches that require their 
expertise (Pfeffer, 1981). This explains why after organizational founding, its initial practices 
and decision will persist (Stinchcombe, 1965; Boeker, 1989). Shift of leadership will weaken 
the impact of early experience because new dominant coalitions might have different 
expertise and preferences, so the entrenchment of interest in past experience may reduce. The 
older the firm, the more likely it has experienced leadership and employee turnover. So older 
firms face a greater likelihood of shifting direction and breaking away from the constraints of 
past experience. 
Above I discussed the view that aging will bring greater ability to change and explore. 
Based on this view, I hypothesize: 
 
H4a: Compared to established firms, new ventures are more likely to enter product-
markets that relate to their technology experience. 
H4b: Compared to established firms, new ventures are more likely to enter product-
markets that relate to their market experience. 
 
H5a: The older the firms, the less likely they will enter product-markets that relate to 
their technology experience. 
H5b: The older the firms, the less likely they will enter product-markets that relate to 
their market experience. 
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Organizational stages and vicarious learning  
 
Above I discussed how organizations learn from their experiences. Besides learning 
from direct experiences, organizations also learn from other firms. The way organizations 
capture the experience of other organizations is called vicarious learning (Levitt & March, 
1988). Organizations learn from each other from three sources (Miner and Haunschild, 1995; 
Baum & Ingram, 1998). First, organizations could selective copy other firms’ routines 
through reverse engineering or benchmarking. Secondly, routines could be transmitted 
between organizations through personal and formal relationships such as personal ties or 
director interlocks. Finally, organization could learn by hiring employees away from other 
companies.  
The product-market entry decision is also subject to influences from other 
organizations (Haveman, 1993; Greve, 1996; 2000; Baum, Li & Usher, 2000).  All these 
three mechanisms could influence a firm’s product-market entry choices. For example, a firm 
could enter a product-market after directly observing other company’s behavior. Firms can 
learn other firms’ product-market choice through contacts. Moreover, by hiring core 
employees from other organizations, a firm might be able to quickly gain the product-market 
knowledge of other firms.  
The tendency of vicarious learning increases when organizations face uncertainties 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Miner and Haunschild, 1995). Uncertainty arises when firm 
cannot anticipate or accurately predict the future states of the environment (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). This could happen when organizations enter new product-markets. Under 
this situation, organizations will choose to use experience of other firms. This is because 
when organizations do not have the knowledge to solve a problem, imitation provides a 
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viable solution with little expense (Cyert & March, 1963). Studies have found firms enter a 
product-market with moderate density because uncertainty has been resolved by other firms 
but the competition has not become intense (Greve, 2000; Haveman, 1993). 
While previous literature makes a general prediction on the mimetic behavior of firms, 
I argue there is systematic heterogeneity among different types of firms. New and established 
firms face the same degree of uncertainty when evaluating a new niche, but their decisions 
might differ. Established firms hesitate to enter because these are changes with uncertain 
outcomes (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). The risk and ambiguity involved in a new niche is 
high, so risk-averse decision makers will wait until others have proven the niches are viable.  
Faced with the same uncertain decision-making contexts, new ventures have a greater 
likelihood to enter without waiting. There are two reasons to make this prediction. First, a 
rich literature suggests entrepreneurs in new ventures are different from managers in 
established organizations. Entrepreneurs have higher tolerance for ambiguity and greater 
willingness to take risks (McGrath, MacMillan & Scheinberg, 1992).  Entrepreneurs feel 
comfortable making decisions in uncertain, complex or novel situations, so they are less 
likely to wait until uncertainty is resolved by other firms’ entry.  
Secondly, entrepreneurs are more likely to use biases and heuristics in their decision 
making process (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). For example, entrepreneurs tend to be 
overconfident about their chance of success. They trust their initial assessment and take 
actions even though enormous uncertainties exist in their decision-making situation. Besides, 
entrepreneurs also tend to generalize based on small samples. In a new niche, little is known 
about customer demand, production cost or other key information. Established firms will 
delay entry until such data becomes available. But entrepreneurs might trust data from 
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nonrandom small samples such as their personal experience to make decisions. Both 
examples suggest new ventures are likely to enter a product-market early before the 
uncertainty about the product-market is fully resolved.  
These arguments point out new ventures might learn from others’ experience 
differently, when compared to established firms. Rather than following other company’s suits 
and entering a crowded product-market like established organizations, new ventures rely less 
on others’ experience and are early entrants to a product-market. 
H6a: Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter product-
markets where many competitors have adopted the technology. 
H6b: Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter product-
markets where many competitors have served the market.  
 
Organizational Features and learning 
 
Above I discussed the role of organizational stages in moderating the relationship 
between experience and product-market entry. Besides organization stages, certain 
organizational features can create competencies that overcome localized learning and 
facilitate distant learning.  Most studies of this “second-order competence” or “dynamic 
capability” point out the importance of having access to other knowledge disciplines.  For 
example, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) summarize some common features of dynamic 
capability in their comprehensive review. First, they argue that bringing together different 
sources of knowledge is a key feature of dynamic capability.  An important example is the 
use of cross-functional teams in the product development process. They also suggest access 
to knowledge outside the focal firm as another key feature of dynamic capability. The 
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examples include external communication in product development process, and ‘gatekeepers’ 
who maintain active communication with other organizations.  
This suggests two organizational features might be extremely important for firms to 
generate dynamic capability and overcome localized learning. The first is the breadth of the 
internal knowledge base. And the second is the access to external knowledge source. I will 
discuss them separately.  
 The idea that broader knowledge can reduce learning path-dependency is not new. 
Research has shown the key to generate new knowledge is the recombination of existing 
knowledge (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000). For recombination 
to happen, an organization must have access to different knowledge resources. Henderson 
and Cockburn (1994) studied the pharmaceutical industry and found the ability to integrate 
knowledge across technology (disciplinary) and markets (therapeutic class) boundaries 
within the organization is a major architectural competence. Similarly, Leonard-Barton (1995) 
pointed out that firms with a narrow knowledge base are more likely to develop core 
capabilities into core rigidities since the firm lacks the ability to be adaptive to different but 
related fields.  Firms with broad knowledge base might be less likely to be locked in a certain 
experiential learning path because the variety of knowledge and experience increase the 
complexity of the causal relationship between experience and outcome. While this might 
reduce the firm’s ability to develop core competence in a specific area, it enhances the firm’s 
strategic flexibility and adaptability to environment change (Volberda, 1996).  
 
H7a: The broader the firms’ technology experience, the less likely they will enter 
product-markets that relate to their technology experience. 
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H7b: The broader the firms’ market experience, the less likely they will enter 
product-markets that relate to their market experience. 
 
 Besides having a broad knowledge base internally, organizations can also gain the 
ability to shift away from experiential learning by assimilating knowledge externally 
(Henderson & Cockburn, 1994).  Access to external knowledge can help firm reduce path-
dependent experiential learning in two ways. First, external knowledge can broaden a firm’s 
knowledge base, and offer opportunities for new combinations to happen. Secondly, the 
access to external knowledge by formal or informal network moves an organization’s 
attention from an internal to an external focus. So the learning of the focal firm is not only 
from own experience, but also from other’s experience. Research has demonstrated that firms 
using acquisitions and alliances to gain different technologies can move away from local 
search (Stuart & Podolny, 1996; Nagarajan & Mitchell, 1998). Besides, firms can also 
establish formal or informal networks with external environment in order to gain knowledge 
and create change. Henderson and Cockburn (1994) found linkages to the larger scientific 
community were crucial to knowledge creation in the pharmaceutical industry.   
This study focuses on the generic pharmaceutical industry. Different from innovative 
pharmaceutical firms, generic pharmaceutical companies produce copies of innovative drugs. 
From the customer’s point of view, they are imitators rather than innovators. However, 
generic firms might also innovate by introducing drugs that are distant from their previous 
products, and their ability to do so is affected by their accessibly to external knowledge 
source.  Here I argue that generic pharmaceutical firm will benefit from their access to 
innovative drug businesses. This is because innovative drug businesses invest more heavily 
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on research and development and marketing, which could generate knowledge spillovers to 
generic business. Moreover, innovative businesses may provide opportunity for follow-up 
generic copies by transferring proprietary knowledge to generic businesses. So for generic 
drug companies, access to innovative drug knowledge can broaden their knowledge base and 
shift their attention to the larger pharmaceutical community. This reduces learning from local 
experience and encourages distant search. 
 
 H8a: Firms that have access to innovative knowledge are less likely to enter product-
markets that relate to their technology experience. 
H8b: Firms that have access to innovative knowledge are less likely to enter product-
markets that relate to their market experience. 
 
Summary of the Model 
 
Organizations learn both from their past experience and from their competitive 
environments. Diversifications as important organizational changes and adaptations are 
guided by organizational learning processes. By integrating learning and organizational 
characteristics, the model presented in this study presents a more integrated picture of firm 
new product-market entry. Moreover, by focusing on the unique characteristics of new and 
mature organizations, this model also takes the firm life cycle effect into consideration.  
Hypothesis 1 posits technology and market experience can create path-dependency in 
learning. Then I propose several moderators to this main hypothesis. First I discuss different 
experiential learning processes between new ventures and established firms and present two 
sets of competing hypotheses. Hypotheses 2 and 3 suggest new ventures pursue less related 
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diversification than established firms. Hypotheses 4 and 5 discuss the view that established 
firm are more likely to pursue less related diversification. Hypotheses 6 is about firm 
vicarious learning, especially how that influences new and established firm’s entry into new 
product-markets. Besides organizational stages, I also discuss two organizational features as 
moderators. Hypothesis 7 is about the interaction effects between organizational knowledge 
breadth and experiential learning. Hypothesis 8 discusses the moderating role of access to 
innovative knowledge in experiential learning.  
The full model is presented in Figure 3.1. A description of data and methods to test 
these hypotheses is provided in the next chapter.  
  
 
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND METHOD 
 
The Generic Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
Because of its economic size and the benefits it delivers to users, the pharmaceutical 
industry is of great importance to the economy and society. The US pharmaceutical industry 
has been the fastest growing in the world. Although the industry has several large players 
existed for 100 years or longer, the industry remained highly fragmented, with relatively low 
industry concentration and hundreds of firms competing in about thirty therapeutic categories 
(Caves, Whinston & Hurwitz, 1991; Bradley & Weber, 2004).  
In the pharmaceutical industry, generic pharmaceutical firms produce copies of 
branded pharmaceuticals, made after the original patent expires. The generic pharmaceutical 
industry can trace its founding to the mid-1960s, when an effort by the US government to 
prove the safety and effectiveness of pharmaceuticals manufactured opened the door for the 
full-scale development of generic products. However, the milestone that started modern 
generic pharmaceutical industry was the Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984. This law allowed 
generic firms to submit Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) for all post-1962 
products. The application is called “abbreviated” because the generic pharmaceutical firms 
are not required to repeat the tests that the innovators used to show the substance to be safe 
and effective. Instead, the generic pharmaceutical firms need to prove that the product is 
identical to the branded drug in strength, dosage form, and route so they are bioequivalent. 
Also the manufacturing process and facility need to be evaluated.  
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The Act opened the gate for generic competition for pharmaceutical products. In 1984, 
generic drugs only accounted for 19% of all prescription drugs (US Congressional Budget 
Office, 1998). In 2004, 53% of all prescriptions dispensed in the U.S. were generics (Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association, 2005). In the 1999-2003 period, the US generics markets have 
grown with a compound annual growth rate of 13.5% (Datamonitor, 2004). The generic drug 
market is expected to continue to grow due to three reasons. First, a significant number of 
widely prescribed brand-name drugs are at or near the end of their period of patent protection. 
Second, managed care organizations are becoming more and more important in the US health 
care market, and they typically prefer lower-cost generic drugs to brand-name products. 
Finally, pharmaceutical professionals and consumers increasingly accept generic drugs. The 
growth of generic drugs brought huge economic benefits to consumers. According to the US 
Congressional Budget Office, generic substitutions for branded drugs saved consumers 
between US$8-10 billion in 1994 (US Congressional Budget Office, 1998).  
 
Supply Side  
 
Drug development and production are closely monitored by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). New drug development processes require huge investments. A new 
drug must go through pre-clinic trials, three phases of human clinical trails and final FDA 
approval to demonstrate safety and effectiveness. This is a lengthy process with an extremely 
high failure rate. It is estimated that only one in 5000 to 10000 compounds tested in the 
laboratory become an approved drug. And among those that do reach the market, only 30% 
achieve commercial success sufficient to recover the average research investment (Bradley & 
Weber, 2004).  
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Manufacturers of generic drugs, however, are not required to conduct complete 
clinical studies of safety and efficacy, and instead typically required to submit data 
illustrating that the generic drug formulation is “bioequivalent” to a previously approved 
drug. “Bioequivalence” means that the rate of absorption and the levels of concentrations of a 
generic drug in the body needed to produce a therapeutic effect that are substantially 
equivalent to those of the previously approved drug. This means generic pharmaceutical 
companies do not invest heavily in extensive research and clinical trails, which lowers the 
barrier to entry in the generic pharmaceutical industry.  But generic firms still need to 
research how to manufacture a drug and to perform bioequivalence studies required by FDA.  
Pharmaceutical production does not enjoy significant scale economies. Because of the 
technical requirement s and quality concerns, both active ingredients and inert ingredients 
have to be produced in batches. This lowers the production related entry barrier for smaller 
firms. However, generic manufactures must comply with the FDA’s current Good 
Manufacturing Practices regulations. Compliance with these regulations requires continuing 
expenditure of time and resources in the areas of development, production, quality control, 
and quality assurance. So entering a generic drug market involves substantial resource 
commitments.  
 
Demand Side 
 
The demand for pharmaceutical industry products not only depends on the tastes of 
ultimate consumers, but also on the behavior of physicians who prescribe the drugs, and the 
retail and hospital pharmacists who dispense the prescriptions. Physicians prescribe drugs 
based on considerations of drug efficacy and patient safety. After the choice of drug 
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(chemical entity) has been made, the physician can designate that drug by either a brand or a 
generic name. Physicians may not be sensitive to drug price differences. Research has shown 
that physicians have strong inertia in their prescription behavior. They are usually not fully 
aware of the information on the comparative effectiveness and risk of substitutable drugs, so 
their choice is strongly influenced by their familiarity with the drug and the custom of peer 
community of prescribers (Temin, 1980). Wholesalers and retail drug chains play an 
important role in the distribution of drugs. Insurance companies and managed care 
organizations (MCOs) are drug payers. MCOs have become the largest drug buyer in the US. 
Through their buying power, MCOs put increasing pressure on drug costs. They develop and 
maintain lists of covered drugs called ‘formularies’ to make pharmaceuticals more cost-
effective. Traditional pharmaceutical companies usually spend hundreds of millions on 
marketing, including physician detailing, direct-to-consumer advertising, medical journal 
advertising. Generic firms invest less in physician detailing and advertising, although they do 
maintain limited sales forces for wholesalers and pharmacy chains. 
 
Firm Strategy and Market Competition 
 
 While regulated by FDA in terms of drug approval and manufacturing procedures and 
standards, generic drug companies have the freedom to select any off-patent drugs they 
would like to produce.  For generic drug companies, the decision of which drug market to 
enter is largely based on whether they have the adequate capability to prepare the application 
and produce the drug, and whether the size and competition in that drug market is acceptable.  
 The first generic manufacturer winning approval for generic equivalents of off-patent 
brand-name drug can usually achieve relatively high revenues and gross profit. However, as 
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other generic manufacturers receive regulatory approvals on competing products, prices and 
revenues typically decline. As a result, the level of profitability from developing and 
manufacturing generic products depends, in part, on a company’s ability to develop and 
introduce new generic products, timely regulatory approval, and the number and timing of 
competing products. 
 
The Advantages of the Empirical Setting 
 
 The U.S. generic pharmaceutical industry provides an ideal setting to test my 
hypotheses for several reasons. First, pharmaceutical industry is an important part of the 
economy. Generic pharmaceutical companies, as a major player in pharmaceutical industry, 
have received increasing attentions from consumers, managers and policy makers.  
Secondly, generic pharmaceutical companies face lower cost of entry into new 
product-markets compared to innovative pharmaceutical companies. This allows generic 
pharmaceutical companies to introduce a greater number of products in a relative shorter 
time span. Moreover, generic pharmaceutical companies also have the incentive to broaden 
their product lines because their customers (wholesalers) would prefer to buy large quantities 
and a full product line from one supplier to reduce cost. Because of these reasons, generic 
pharmaceutical companies tend to have wider product variety and have relative frequent new 
product entries.  
Thirdly, our interests are in new ventures. The generic pharmaceutical industry 
witnessed a high rate of new entrants over the time due to its low entry barriers. The review 
of generic pharmaceutical companies during the study period shows that many firms emerged 
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from traditional company extensions and from entrepreneurial foundings. Entrepreneurship 
activities have been very active in this industry.  
Finally, product information is widely available in the generic pharmaceutical 
industry. The regulatory agency, FDA, collects and publishes data on every drug that has 
been approved for sale in order to protect the interests of consumers. This ensures that my 
data is compete and accurate. Because this dataset has historical data on firm drugs and 
covers both public and private firms, it reduces the sample selection bias. The data on firm 
products tends to be difficult to get in management studies and most studies use trade 
journals or media report to collect information on firm new products.  The use of data on 
generic pharmaceutical companies overcome this barrier and provides unique and valuable 
information on the major output of firms and their products. This enables tests on new 
product-market entry at the product rather than the coarse industry level.  
 
Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
 
I use both qualitative and quantitative data in this study. Interviews were conducted 
with top management team members in 6 pharmaceutical start-ups in North Carolina 
Research Triangle Park area. Because no comprehensive theory of new venture new product 
entry exits, the interviews serve the purpose of understanding the context of new venture 
product diversification and validate the major assumptions and propositions. Guided by a 
case-study protocol, open-ended questions were used in the interview. The mangers were 
asked to describe their current technology and product portfolio, the motivation and search 
procedures for new products, as well as their approach to new product development. A copy 
of the protocol is provided in Appendix I. Each interview lasts about one hour. Most 
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interviews (4 out of 6) were attended by two researchers. Notes were taken during the 
interview by both researchers and compared after interview to make sure the understanding 
and interpretation of the qualitative data is uniform.  Results from the qualitative data 
analysis are presented in Chapter Five. 
The quantitative data was collected from multiple sources. The firm and product 
information in generic pharmaceutical industry was collected by reviewing drug applications 
approved by the U.S. Federal Drug Administration (FDA). This database provides 
information on firms and their drugs, including drug names, the applicants, active ingredients, 
forms, strength, approval dates and application numbers which can link to more detailed 
information about these drugs. A second source is e-fact database, which is used to match 
each drug to an appropriate therapeutic area. A third source is Verispan SPA, which provide 
sales figure of therapeutic areas.  Finally, firm founding dates and mergers and acquisitions 
are gathered through a comprehensive search on Thomson Company and Resource Center 
and Lexis-Nexis. An exhaustive search on the Internet and available databases was 
conducted to fill up missing information on drugs or firms. 
The data contains the population of firms (n=205) that produced more than one 
generic drug during 1984-2004. Since the focus of the study is on firm new product entries 
beyond the initial products, my analysis only includes firms that chose to have more than one 
product. I also do not consider the generic drugs before 1984 because of the significance of 
Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984 on generic pharmaceutical industry. This new legislation 
dramatically changed the requirements of generic drug approval, so it is appropriate to view 
generic drugs entry decisions prior to 1984 as totally different than those made in 1884 and 
ensuing years.  As the starting point of modern generic pharmaceutical industry, year 1984 
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was of great importance in this study. Firms established in or after 1984 are viewed as new 
entrants to generic industry, while those founded before 1984 are treated as established firms. 
The data contains 56 new entrants, and 149 incumbents.  
One potential problem introduced by only focusing on firms that diversified might 
introduce sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979) because the choice of diversification is 
strategic rather than random, and some unobserved factors that influence the choice of 
diversification might also influence the direction of diversification. To correct for this bias, I 
use Heckman’s (1976) two-stage procedure. I first use probit regression on all generic firms 
(those that did and did not introduce a second product; n=284) to predict the likelihood of 
introducing a second product. Then I add the estimator (Inverse Mills ratio) as an additional 
regressor to the second regression (thus controlling for extraneous factors that influence the 
diversification decision) to predict the product-market entry direction of firms that diversify 
(n=205). 
A firm experiences a new product-market entry when it received a new approval from 
FDA to produce a generic drug. An approval is qualified as “new approval” to the firm only 
when the following criteria were met: (1) The approval must have a different application 
number than the previous approvals; and (2) The approval cannot be on the same drug that 
the firm received approval on in the same year. By applying these criteria, the study excludes 
same drugs with different strength and dosage form as new product-market entries. After 
eliminating duplications and repeated approvals, the data contains 4463 new product-market 
entries.  
In this study, each new product-market entry is viewed as a result of the focal firm’s 
strategic choice among all available alternatives. A drug can be characterized based on two 
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dimensions: the drug’s therapeutic area, and its form and route.  When choosing a new drug, 
a firm will first determine what therapeutic areas they would like to target. The choice of an 
appropriate therapeutic area is important not only because different therapeutic areas have 
different market attractiveness, but also because different therapeutic areas require different 
marketing knowledge and resources, such as customers, distribution channels and area-
specific reputations.  
Another important decision of a drug firm is to the choice among different drug forms 
and route. The drug form refers to the physical status of the drug and the route refers to the 
way it is delivered in the body. Because drugs in different forms require very different 
production equipment and process (Scott Morton, 1999), a drug in a new form might require 
additional investments. The route of a drug is about how drug is absorbed into the body, so 
the knowledge about route is needed in the research and development process, and might 
affect the preparation of the bioequivalence test FDA requires. So the choice of drug form 
and route will be critical for drug firms on the technology dimension. 
The dependent variable, firm new drug entry, is modeled as a firm choice on market 
and technology dimensions. On the market dimension, a firm could choose from 19 major 
therapeutic areas. The classification on therapeutic areas provided by FDA and the complete 
list of 19 therapeutic areas is available in Appendix II. On the technology dimension, a firm 
is allowed to choose from 6 major forms (The classification is included in Appendix II). Two 
separate models were produced to test the choice on therapeutic area and drug forms. Each 
dependent variable is binary, set to 1 if that element was selected and set to 0 otherwise. 
The independent variable, market experience, is measured by matching values for the 
current opportunity’s therapeutic class with the characteristics of drugs in the firm’s portfolio. 
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For example, when examining therapeutic area choice, a set of independent variables is 
constructed that explore the firms’ prior experience with each of the 19 possible areas. 
Similarly, technology experience is measured by matching values for the current 
opportunity’s form with the characteristics of drugs in the firm’s portfolio. In both cases, I 
count the number of times a firm has had experience with that feature of the new entry 
opportunity. Firm access to innovative knowledge is measured by a binary variable. If the 
firm also produces innovative drugs, the variable is coded as 1, other wise is 0. Knowledge 
diversity is the number of distinct knowledge fields (distinct therapeutic areas or distinct drug 
forms) that a firm had prior experience.  
In this study, I control both market related and firm related factors that might 
influence firm choices. Market size is measured by drug sales. Market densities are 
constructed from the FDA drug database by counting the cumulative number of firms that 
produce the same drug. Market entrants measure the number of firms that entered the market 
at the time of focal firm entry. Similarly, technology density is measured by the cumulative 
number of firms that adopted a similar technology and technology entrants is measured by 
the number of other firms’ adoptions up to the time of focal firm entry.  Product density is 
the cumulative number of products introduced in a technology field. Product Entrants is the 
number of new products that belong to the technology field that the focal firm entered. 
Finally, firm size is controlled and is measured by the number of drugs a firm produces.  
In addition to the variables mentioned above, a set of variables is uses to predict the 
likelihood of diversification in the first-stage regression. Theory suggests three major 
antecedents of diversification: Prior performance (Bowman, 1982); external environment 
(Miles, 1982; Rumelt, 1974); and firm resources and competences (Penrose, 1959). So I 
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include variables that capture these three aspects in my study. Previous performance is 
measured by the sales of a firm’s first drug.  Market size and market density of the first drug 
are variables that capture external environment of the firm. Dummy variables for therapeutic 
area and form of first drug are variables that capture the resources and competences of the 
firm. Other variables include the year of firm founding, the year of the firm’s first drug, firm 
age, the time to first product, firm foreign ownership, extended release technology1, firm 
stages (new venture vs. established firm) and firm independence. 
 
Statistical Model 
 
The firms’ decision of entering one of a fixed number of market and technology fields 
can be assessed using a conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974). The advantage of 
conditional logit model over other models involving the choice among three or more 
categories (e.g. mutinomial logit model) is that conditional logic is appropriate when choice 
among alternatives is treated as a function of the characteristics of the alternatives, rather 
than (or in addition to) the characteristics of the individual making the choice. This is a 
precise fit for this study, since each firm has different level of technology or market 
experience with each possible choice. The conditional logit model has been extensively used 
in management studies in recent years, particularly in research of firm choices such as 
location choices (Chang & Park, 2005; Kalnins & Chung, 2004), market niche choices 
(Greve, 2000) and choice of suppliers (Hoetker, 2005).  
In the conditional logit model, the probability that a firm choose alternative j is given 
by the following equation: 
                                                 
1 Extended release technology is controlled here because it could be applied to a wide variety of drugs. 
Leveraging this technology to other drugs provides firm incentive to diversify. 
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Where Pij is the probability that firm i choose alternative j, J is the total number of 
alternatives, and Zij denotes the vector of characteristics of the jth alternative for firm i, with 
the corresponding parameter vectors denoted by α.  
A key assumption of conditional logit model is that alternatives are not substitutable 
and independent from each other (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). In this study, the choices 
are discrete and clear. Each therapeutic area and drug form and route has a distinct difference 
from the other. I also performed the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) test 
(Hausman and McFadden, 1984) to make sure the IIA assumption is held in the study.  
It is worth mentioning that conditional logit model is not suitable for analyzing 
variables that do not take different values for different alternatives. Although these variables 
can be estimated by creating a set of interaction terms, it will use up degrees of freedom 
when the number of alternatives is large. This limitation accounts for the scarcity of control 
variables in the model specification. 
Because the event of entering new product-markets happens to a firm more than one 
time, the issue of repeated events must be deal with to avoid estimation biases. To ensure the 
independence of firms, this study follows the technique used in previous literature (Chang & 
Park, 2005; Henisz & Delios, 2001) by alternatively examining only one choice set for each 
firm. Here I use the first diversification event of each firm. If the new specification shows 
similar results as pooled conditional logit analysis, then it suggests independence of firms is 
not a concern and the results are robust. 
The data are analyzed using SAS 9.1., and the results are reported in Chapter Six.  
  
 
CHAPTER FIVE: INTERVIEWS AND QUALITATIVE DATA 
 
In this chapter, I report from interviews with founders and executives of 6 
pharmaceutical new ventures in the Research Triangle Area, North Carolina. Due to the lack 
of any comprehensive theory of new product-market strategy in early stage ventures, the 
interviews serve the purpose of further specifying the constructs and relationship proposed in 
the model developed in Chapter Three. In the theoretical model, the basic assumption is that 
new ventures do develop new products beyond their initial product. Furthermore, I proposed 
that new ventures might pursue new products that different from their current products from 
technology or market dimensions. Finally, I argued that new ventures might acquire market 
or technology competence externally. To validate these assumptions, the interview data are 
introduced to show how informants report on these issues: (1) Is new product search initiated 
and why; (2) How new products are selected based on technology and market dimensions; 
and (3) How the new product development is implemented by incorporating external 
competences. In addition, informants also reported their exit strategies. 
  
 
Is New Product Search Initiated and Why 
 
Developing new products has been cited as one of the major considerations among 
new ventures. 5 out of 6 companies (83%) expressed their interests in seeking new products. 
 
“…Yes, we will have more products. We will have our own product, not partnering 
with other companies.” 
Chief Executive Officer, Company A       
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 Of course, different parties in a new venture might have divergent views on whether 
new ventures should develop new products. In one of the interviews, the manager talked 
about the conflict between investors and managers: 
 
“Investors prefer focus (on one product), yet focus will limit the value of the 
technology.” 
Chief Financial Officer, Company O 
 
 
New product search can be initiated for a variety of reasons. The goal of developing a 
new product is usually to secure high performance in the future. For example, some firms 
view developing new product as a natural way to grow and increase the value of the new 
venture. 
 
“With more products, we have better control of our company.” 
Chief Executive Officer, Company A 
 
 
New product might also be a natural choice when the market size is large and provide 
enough demand for multi products. 
 
 “Parkinson’s disease is a multi billion market. Considering the size of this market, we 
will have at least two products.” 
 Chief Scientific Officer, Company D 
 
 
In other cases, new product search might not be motivated by demand, but by the 
economic of scale and scope on the supply side.  
 
 “The plant (we studied and used for the first product) has many other applications 
such as multivitamins. We will explore the other use of this plant. I have rich 
background and knowledge in natural plants and herbs. There are many herbs have 
been used for a long time (in Europe and Asia) but have no active ingredients 
identified. I will obtain patents for other herbs and develop products from them.” 
 Founder, Company F 
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The development of new product is not necessarily linked to failure in the present. On 
the contrary, developing a new product might depend on the success of current product. 
 
“We want to concentrate on this (first) product. Get data so we can get another round 
of funding…Biotech companies that have multiple products are usually those that got 
very successful with their first product.” 
Chief Financial Officer, Company H 
 
  
 
How are New Products Selected  
 
The direction of new product search usually is influenced by the current market and 
technology of the firm. From our interview, three groups of product development strategy 
emerged, which confirms our product development patterns developed in Chapter Three. The 
first group of firms has a widely applicable technology. For them, new products are more 
likely to be the leverage of current technology into new markets. In my theoretical model, I 
call this technology exploitation strategy. There are two firms fall into this group, which 
accounts for 33% of the ventures interviewed.  
 
“We have several different products under development. They are based on one 
scientific concept and core technology. In the future, we will have more products. The 
new products are likely to use our technology to apply to different customer 
functions.” 
Chief Executive Officer, Company A 
 
 
Another company offered a similar story. 
 
 
“Our technology is a platform that could be applied to all power forms that need to be 
delivered precisely. In pharmaceutical industry, it could be used to make drugs that 
need to be delivered to lungs such as pulmonary disease, pain management or insulin. 
However, the product’s application might extend far beyond powders of medicine. 
Wherever powders need precise mixing and delivery such as metals or paints could 
be a potential new product market.” 
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Chief Financial Officer, Company O 
  
 
Besides exploring new market based on current technology, a new venture can also 
choose new product based on current market. When using current market as the leveraging 
point, a new venture enter explore new technology to better serve the current target customer. 
This is similar to the market exploitation strategy in my theoretical model. One of the firms 
(18%) uses this new product strategy. 
  
“I have 30 year’s experience in this (Parkinson’s disease) area. Our new product will 
improve current technology. We have more than 20 drug candidates at the different 
stages of drug development pipeline”. 
 Chief Scientific Officer, Company D 
 
 
Not all companies choose to focus on one core technology or one core market when 
selecting new product-markets. Some new ventures are neither confined by current 
technology nor market. There are two firms that we interviewed fall into this category (33%). 
A common characteristic of these two companies is that their expertise is not on one core 
technology (in terms of IP), but contains general knowledge about where to search and how 
to develop a technology. Company F’s founder has unique knowledge about natural herbs 
and their uses in medicines. Company M owns the largest collection of funguses and a 
database about their historical use. Both companies claimed that their new product will be in 
this general area, but not limited to any one herb/fungus or to any one type of disease as 
market application. 
 
“Our technology is our knowledge in fungus and how to extract chemical compound 
from fungus. We have the widest collection of fungus, and this collection is almost 
non-replicable. The goal is to find new medicine from fungus. Currently we are 
developing a product of organic herbicide. We are searching for possible product to 
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cure cancer. From our experience on fungi research, we learned which funguses are 
active and focus on them. We will look for antibiotics, antivirus and anticancer drugs. 
And we may explore agricultural uses.” 
Founder, Company M 
 
“In Europe and Asia, many herbs have been used as medicine for centuries, yet they 
do not have reference in the US because no active ingredients have been identified. 
My strategy is to patent these herbs and develop medicines from them.” 
Founder, Company F 
 
 
The new product search strategies used in the new ventures we interviewed confirm 
the topology I developed in the theoretical model. Using the level of technology and market 
newness as two axes, the product search strategy in new ventures can fall onto any part of 
this two dimensional space. Company A and O use existing technology but apply to distinct 
markets to form the new product, so they fall onto the bottom left corner of the space and can 
be classified as technology exploitation. Company D, on the other hand, focus on the same 
market yet bring in other technologies to develop new product, which fall on to upper right-
hand side of the space and could be classified as market exploitation. Company F and M 
search for both new technology and new market application to generate the new product, so 
their strategies are classified as exploration. A chart is provided bellow to illustrate the 
classification (See Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1: A Two Dimensional Space of Venture New Product Strategy  
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How is the New Product Development Implemented  
 
In terms of developing new products, many firms mentioned using partnership to gain 
necessary resources to develop new products. New ventures can use partners as a source of 
funding. But more importantly, they also use partners as access to critical knowledge 
resources and expertise. 
  
“We develop our products through partnerships. Partners fund research. When the 
product is approved, they pay a royalty to us. Partnership is our growth strategy, we 
learn from partners on how to design clinic trials and commercialize a product. In the 
future, we will have our own products and do it ourselves.” 
Chief Executive Officer, Company A 
 
“Because the unit (the device) and the chemical must be tested together, the preferred 
route of product development is through partners with firms with IP in the chemicals, 
which can be shared with our device. We are negotiating deals to use drug from one 
company to co-develop products.” 
Chief Financial Officer, Company O 
 
  In the product development process, many companies consider focusing on research 
and development, while outsourcing other complimentary activities such as manufacturing 
and marketing. 
 
“We will outsource everything except research and technology. Find partner to do 
clinical trails, manufacturing and marketing and sales.” 
Chief financial Officer, Company O 
 
“We are going to outsource the clinic trial to other companies. We are going to 
license to sell the product because we do not have our own marketing force and our 
strength is R&D.” 
Founder, Company F 
 
 
However, some companies expressed their concerns for using partnerships. 
 
 
“Big drug companies have “not-invented-here syndrome”. They would not accept a 
technology that is the substitution of their current technology. The licensing partners 
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always want to control all the technology. We would be at the mercy of the big 
Parma.” 
Chief Scientific Officer, Company D 
 
“Investors usually influence the strategic direction of the company. Choosing 
investors actually means take a choice and eliminate others.” 
Chief Financial Officer, Company O 
 
 
Finding partner might itself be a demanding work for new ventures. Several firms 
mentioned they are stand-alone because it is difficult to find a partner. 
 
“Nowadays, big pharmaceutical companies want to work with firms that have a more 
mature product.”  
Chief Financial Officer, Company H 
 
“There is a chicken and egg problem. Investors would like to see the validation of the 
technology (product), yet validation needs money.” 
Chief Financial Officer, Company O 
 
 
 
Exit Strategies 
 
For entrepreneurs and early investors who started new ventures, being able to harvest 
and exit the venture might be a critical issue. During hot stock markets, IPO might be a very 
popular route to exit. However, a less optimistic market might makes this option less viable 
and firms might pursue other channels such as sell out to a larger company.  
 
“In the future, when we complete animal test, or even Phase I clinic trail, we might 
find a partner. We want their commercialization ability and expertise in clinic trails. It 
is very likely they would just buy us out.” 
Chief Financial Officer, Company H 
 
A sell out to a partner might be a strategic choice to gain greater value in the 
subsequent public offering. 
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“Market is not good. Recent biotech IPOs have smaller issue size. Going public also 
lose part of the ownership and control. So why not find a partner. And with a partner 
you can get better valuation from the market.” 
Chief Financial Officer, Company H 
 
 
Or it can be the only way for the new venture to survive. 
 
 
“Because we could not raise additional funds, merger became our best way to 
survive.” 
Chief Scientific Officer, Company D 
 
 
Although selling out to big pharmaceutical firms might be the only viable exit 
strategy, most companies still prefer to stand-alone. Among the venture we interviewed, four 
expressed that being independent would be their first preference (66%). 
 
“For future growth, our first preference is to be independent. But partner and sell out 
to a big pharmaceutical company might also be possible.” 
Chief Financial Officer, Company O 
 
“We would rather stand alone… If the terms are correct, we may sell.” 
Founder, Company M 
 
 
Summary 
 
In the companies I interviewed, the development of new products is one of the major 
considerations for new ventures, especially in the long term. The motivation for generating a 
variety of products is most likely based on the expectation of higher performance, either 
because of the economic of scale and scope.  When searching for the new product-market to 
enter, different firms use different strategies. Some firms focus on one core technology while 
exploring multiple market applications, others focus on one market and explore multiple 
technologies. Also there are companies do not limit to any one technology or market, but 
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widely explore all possibilities within a general domain. A common theme emerged, however, 
is that the new product strategy always fit the endowments of resources and capabilities of 
the new venture. When developing new products, new ventures heavily rely on partnership, 
especially for financial and complementary resources. Another function for partnership is to 
gain critical knowledge resources. For some new ventures, partnership could be a learning 
process. Selling out to a partner is also a popular exit strategy for early investors and 
managers of the new venture. However, independence seems to be their preference, and most 
new ventures would only sell out when they have no other choice. 
 In sum, the case studies confirmed the constructs and model developed in Chapter 
three, providing the foundation for the quantitative analysis reported in the following chapter.  
 
  
 
CHAPTER SIX:  ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
I have split the analysis of the data into three parts. First, I analyze a firm’s decision 
to introduce a second product using the model outlined in Chapter three. This analysis is 
based on all firms in the generic pharmaceutical industry, including firms that choose to enter 
a second product and firms that do not. Because I cannot estimate the pattern of 
diversification for firms that do not have a second product, the firms that choose not to have a 
second generic drug were excluded from the following analysis. This might cause self-
selection bias (Heckman, 1979) so this first analysis also provides the information to correct 
for the self-selection bias in the following analyses.  
Next, I analyze the direction of firm new product-market entries. This analysis is 
central to my argument, and it contains tests of major hypotheses in my theoretic model. I 
separate the analysis into two parts. The first part analyzes the first diversification of firms, 
which is the test for hypothesis 2 and 4. The second part uses all diversifying entries (that is, 
the first and subsequent diversification decisions) to test all other hypotheses. Because the 
analysis excludes single product firms, the self-selection bias was controlled in the regression 
analysis. 
I end this chapter by giving a summary of all the hypotheses and their results.  
 
 
The Choice of Diversification 
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 This analysis contains all 284 firms in the generic pharmaceutical industry as of 1984, 
and all entrants during 1984 and after. The descriptive statistics for the dataset and the 
correlations are shown in Appendix III. Results of the probit analysis are shown in table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1  Probit Regression on the Choice of Diversification 
No Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
1 Year .024  .008 .010 .052 .023 
2 Time to first product -.082 * -.084 *  -.077† -.121** -.091* 
3 Year of Founding -.084 ** -.086 **  -.074† -.118** -.087* 
4 Foreign Ownership -.482 * -.474 *  -.864** -.952*** -.881** 
5 Extended Release 
Technology .076 -.004 -.390 -.343 -.540 
6 Performance -.000  -.000  -.000 .000 .000 
7 Market Size  -.000  -.000 .000 .000 
8 Market Density  .001 .002 .002 .002* 
9 Market Entrants  -.012 * -.015† -.014† -.016 
10 Mkt1-Anesthetics    .943 1.245 1.227 
11 Mkt3-Antimicrobials   .304 .399 .503 
12 Mkt5-Cardiovascular-renal   1.3032 1.098 1.256 
13 Mkt6-Central nerve system   .591 .703 .798 
14 Mkt8-Gastrointestinals   .653 .723 .790 
15 Mkt9-Metaboics/Nutrients   .911 1.088 1.111 
16 Mkt10-Hormone   .380 .590 .468 
17 Mkt12-Skin   .139 .251 .298 
18 Mkt13-Neurologics   -.282 -.571 -.191 
19 Mkt14-Oncolytics   .065 -.123 .104 
20 Mkt15-Ophthalmics   .384 .230 .144 
21 Mkt16-Relief of pain   .538 .571 .732 
22 Mkt18-Respiratory tract   .608 .763 .839 
23 Tech1-Oral solid   .845† .856† .973† 
24 Tech2-Oral liquid   .595 .646 .697 
25 Tech3-Topical   .682 .737 .800 
26 Tech4-Injection   .920† .927† 1.009† 
27 Tech5-Ocular/Otic   .518 .645 .584† 
28 Innovative knowledge   .360† -.056 .412 
29 Firm Independence   -.592* -.684* -.148 
30 Firm Stages   -.780** -1.100*** .096 
31 Innovative 
knowledge*Firm Stages 
  
 1.160*  
32 Firm Independence*Firm 
Stages 
  
  -1.039† 
 Constant 120.078 *** 155.837*** 126.670 131.657† 129.097† 
       
 Observations 284 284 277 277 277 
 Log Likelihood -148.81 -145.66 -125.623 -122.532 -123.695 
 Chi-Square (d.f.) 38.2(6)*** 44.49(9)*** 78.08 (30)*** 84.26(31)*** 81.93(31)***
 Pseudo R-Square .113 .133 .237 .256 .249 
 Change in Chi-Square 
(d.f.) 
38.2(6)*** 6.29(3) † 34.59(21)* 6.18(1)* 3.85(1)* 
† p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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The dependent variable of the analysis is whether or not the firm introduces a second 
product, and coded 1 for firms that chose to have a second product. The descriptive statistics 
shows 72% of firms chose to have a second product. The correlations between the 
independent variables are generally small, with several exceptions. Firm year of founding 
and time to first product was negatively correlated. Market size and density and year are 
correlated, suggesting size and density increase as time passes. Topical drug form and skin 
market are also correlated, as would naturally be expected. 
The analysis is done by stepwise addition of effects to show how the model behaves 
when external and internal related influences on firm diversification are included. The 
models are nested, allowing stepwise testing for improvement of fit. The first model shows 
the effect of control variables and prior performance on the likelihood of having a second 
product. The second model added external factors such as the market size and density of the 
first product. The third model introduces internal factors including the market and technology 
experience of the firm. Finally, the last two models show the moderating effect of firm life-
stages on the relationship between firm characteristics and the likelihood of diversification.  
The chi-square tests at the bottom of table of table 6.1 show that each model is highly 
significant (p<.001), suggesting in each model, that the variables as a whole can significantly 
explain the likelihood of introducing a second product. In the control variables only model 
(model 1), time to first product, firm year of founding and foreign ownership are significant 
(p<.05). And the effects of these three control variables show consistent significance in other 
models, suggesting that younger firms and foreign firms are less likely to have a second 
product. Also firms that take a long time to introduce their first product are less likely to have 
a second product. Model 2 shows marginal improvement over control only model, as 
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indicated by the significant chi-square increase over model 1 (p<.1). This suggests market 
related variables, especially the number of market entrants, have some impact on the 
likelihood of entering a second product. Firms are less likely to have a second product when 
the first product faces intense competition from other firms. Model 3 added firm product-
market and organizational experience. Some types of market experience (Antidotes, 
Hematology and Contrast Media) were dropped from the analysis because they do not add 
variance to the dependent variable, so the sample size decreased to 277. This model shows a 
significant improvement (p<.05) over the model that only contains control and market related 
variables (Model 2), suggesting firm knowledge and experience are critical in explaining the 
tendency for having a new product.  
In terms of specific variables, market and technology knowledge of the firm seem to 
have some effect (p<.1). Specifically, firms with experience in oral solid technology and 
injection technology are more likely to enter a second product, compared to other 
technologies. The positive coefficient of innovative knowledge (p<.1) indicates firms that 
have innovative knowledge are more likely to diversify into a second product. Independent 
firms are found to be less likely to diversify, suggesting firms that have access to parent’s 
knowledge are more likely to enter new product-markets (p<.05).  
I also tested if firm stages (new ventures vs. established firms) moderate the above 
relationships. Firm stages itself is significant in predicting firms’ likelihood of have a new 
product (p<.001), suggesting established firms (coded as 0) are more likely to have a second 
product compared to new ventures (coded as 1). To explore the moderating effect, I separated 
the sample in to two groups, new ventures and established firms. The results are reported in 
table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2  Probit Regression of New ventures and Established firms 
  New Ventures Established Firms 
No Variables  Control & 
Market  
Full  Control & 
Market  
Full 
1 Year -.009 .021  
2 Time to first product .030 -.025 -.103** -.112†
3 Year of Founding -.019 -.114† -.099** -.110†
4 Foreign ownership .098 -.153 -1.07*** -1.572***
5 Extended Release Technology -.314 -1.652 .254 -.100
6 Firm Performance -.000 .000† .000 .000
7 Market Size -.000 -.000† -.000 -.000
8 Market Density -.000 .005† .003* .003
9 Market Entrants -.003 .003 -.017† -.021†
10 Mkt1-Anesthetics  251.019  .583
11 Mkt3-Antimicrobials -5.322***  .876
12 Mkt5-Cardiovascular-renal -4.190**  1.907
13 Mkt6-Central nerve system -4.585***  1.116
14 Mkt8-Gastrointestinals -3.919**  1.579
15 Mkt9-Metaboics/Nutrients -4.279**  
16 Mkt10-Hormone  -.147
17 Mkt12-Skin 244.105***  -.469
18 Mkt13-Neurologics -5.286  
19 Mkt14-Oncolytics -6.457***  1.241
20 Mkt15-Ophthalmics 253.806  
21 Mkt16-Relief of pain -6.326***  2.050
22 Mkt18-Respiratory tract -3.825**  1.057
23 Tch1-Oral solid 254.187***  .587
24 Tch2-Oral liquid 254.069***  .047
25 Tch3-Topical 4.734  1.670
26 Tch4-Injection 255.306***  .542
27 Tch5-Ocular/Otic -5.355**  .532
28 Innovative knowledge 1.479**  -.013
29 Firm Independence -1.224†  -.603
 Constant 55.797 -62.578 198.012 219.486
   
 Observations 103 98 181 165
 Log likelihood -65.613 -41.381 -66.797 -54.250
 Chi-square (d.f.) 10.78(9) 52.93(28)** 35.28(8)*** 50.93(25)**
 Pseudo R-Square .076 .390 .209 .320
 Change in Chi-Square (d.f.) 42.15(19)**  15.65(17)
† p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
The sub-sample analysis shows very interesting results. For new ventures, the control 
and market variables are not able to significantly explain the likelihood of diversification 
because the model was not significant. However, when firm knowledge and experience 
variables are added, the model became highly significant both in itself (p<.01)  and over the 
control and market variables only model (p<.01). In comparison, for the established firms, 
   
  87
control variables and external market factors have strong effects on the likelihood of 
diversification (p<.001). Adding firm internal variables does not improve model fitness, as 
suggested by the non-significant chi-square change. The results suggest for new ventures and 
established firms, the factors that influence their likelihood of diversification might be 
different. Market factors are important for established firms, while firm knowledge and 
experience are more important for new ventures. 
The moderating effect of firm stages received strong support. As can be seen from 
table 6.2, the types of market and technology a firm used in its first product have very strong 
association with the likelihood of product diversification for new ventures, but not for 
established firms. To further demonstrate the differences between two groups, I picked one 
market type and one technology type to illustrate the relative effect of market and technology 
experience for new ventures and established firms. Since in probit regression, it is not 
appropriate to directly compare coefficients, I calculated the ratios of coefficients (Train, 
1998; Hoetker, 2005). For example, computing the ratio βt2/βd yields a value of 50800 for 
new ventures and 15.67 for established firms. This results means that new ventures value 
experience in oral liquid technology as much as 50800 times a unit market density. In 
comparison, established firms only value the experience in oral liquid technology 15.67 times. 
When making a diversification decision, new ventures value technology experience almost 
3241 times more than established firms. This difference is significant at the .1 level, further 
supporting the moderating effect of firm stages on the relationship between experience and 
the likelihood of diversification.  
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Variables β New Ventures Established Firms Chi-Square Test 
 
Tech2-Oral liquid βt2 254.069 .047  
Mkt12-Skin βm2 244.105 -.469  
Market Density βd .005 .003  
Ratios βt2/βd 50800 15.67 3.63(1) † 
 βm2/βd 48821 156.33 3.65(1) † 
                         † p<.10;  
 
From table 6.2, the coefficient of innovative knowledge was positive and significant 
(p<.001) for new ventures, but not for established firms. Similarly, the coefficient of firm 
independence was negative and significant (p<.1) for new ventures, but not for established 
firms. To further probe the interaction effect, I created the interaction term between firm 
stages and innovative knowledge, and venture status and firm independence. The interaction 
effects are found, as indicated by the significant coefficients of interaction term and the 
significant improvement of model fit over the main effect only model (Model 4 and Model 5 
improve model fit over Model 3 at p<.05, p<.05 level respectively) in table 6.1.3. The 
interaction term between firms stages and innovative knowledge is positive and significant 
(p<.05), indicating the effect of having innovative knowledge on the likelihood of 
diversification is stronger for new ventures than for established firms.. 
Summary: Among three types of diversification antecedents, significant effects were 
found for both external environment and internal competence. Market density and 
competition can influence the likelihood of diversification. Firm technology and market 
experience, access to innovative knowledge and firm independence are associated with 
greater likelihood of entering a second product. Furthermore, splitting data into sub-samples 
shows theses hypothesized variables have distinct effect for new ventures and for established 
firms. By comparing coefficients and examining interaction effect, the results lend strong 
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support for the hypothesized differences between firm stages. Compared to established firms, 
the effect of technology and market experience and access to innovative knowledge on the 
likelihood of diversification is stronger for new ventures. The findings are summarized in 
table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3  Summary of Findings – Choice of Diversification 
1 A firm’s existing technology and market knowledge will affect its likelihood of entering a new 
product market. 
2 Compared to established firms, new ventures’ existing technology and market knowledge will have a 
stronger effect on the likelihood of entering a new product-market. 
 
3 Firms that have access to innovative knowledge are more likely to enter new product-markets. 
 
4 Compared to established firms, having access to innovative knowledge has a stronger effect on the 
likelihood of entering a new product-market for new ventures. 
 
5 Independent firms are less likely to enter new product-markets. 
 
6 The older the firm, the more likely it will diversify. 
 
7 The faster a firm introduces its first product, the more likely it will diversify. 
 
8 Firms with foreign ownership are less likely to diversify. 
 
 
In the next section, test of hypotheses 2 and 4 are provided to highlight the factors 
that influence of the patterns of the relatedness of first diversification. 
 
The First Diversification 
This study contains 199 firms that have more than one product and entered the first 
stage regression analysis (Among 205 firms that have more than one product, 6 were dropped 
out of the first stage analysis when market and technology dummies were entered into 
regression). Appendix IV gives the descriptive statistics and the correlations. 
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The descriptive statistics show that 41% of firms entered a related market in their first 
diversification, while 83% of firms entered a related technology in their first product 
diversification. Among all the firms, 27% are new ventures. The correlations have a similar 
pattern as the first set of analysis. Probit regression was conducted to test hypotheses 2 and 4, 
which is summarized in table 6.4. In order to investigate the differences between market 
relatedness and technology relatedness, I ran two separate regressions. The first one use 
technology relatedness as dependent variables and the second use market relatedness. The 
two regressions are reported in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 respectively. 
Table 6.4  Summary of Hypotheses – First Diversification 
H2a:  
 
Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter product-markets that relate to 
their technology experience. 
H2b:  
 
Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter product-markets that relate to 
their market experience. 
H4a: Compared to established firms, new ventures are more likely to enter product-markets that relate to 
their technology experience. 
H4b: Compared to established firms, new ventures are more likely to enter product-markets that relate to 
their market experience. 
 
Table 6.5  Probit Regression on Technology Related Entry 
No Variable Model 1 Model 2 
1 Year .103 .105 
2 Time to first diversification -.127† -.128† 
3 Year of Founding -.126† -.127† 
4 Lambda 1.065* 1.036 
5 Performance .000 .000 
6 Market Size -.000** -.000** 
7 Market Density .005** .004** 
8 Market Entrants -.020* -.020* 
9 Tech1-Oral solid .544 .535 
10 Tech2-Oral liquid -.509 -.516 
11 Tech3-Topical -.550 -.502 
12 Tech4-Injection 1.473† 1.461 
13 Tech5-Ocular/Otic -1.017 -.102 
14 Firm Stages  .033 
 Constant 45.134 45.858 
    
 Observations 199 199 
 Log Likelihood -71.502 -71.499 
 Chi-Square (d.f.) 38.98(13)*** 38.98(14)*** 
 Pseudo R-Square .214 .214 
 Change in Chi-Square (d.f.)  0 
 † p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 6.6: Probit Regression on Market Related Entry 
No Variable Model 1 Model 2 
1 Year -.102 -.074 
2 Time to first diversification .069 .032 
3 Year of Founding .064 .026 
4 Lambda -.206 -.707 
5 Performance .000 .000 
6 Market Size .000 .000 
7 Market Density .002 .002 
8 Market Entrants -.002 -.002 
9 Mkt1-Anesthetics  6.718 6.553 
10 Mkt3-Antimicrobials 6.245 6.105 
11 Mkt5-Cardiovascular-renal 5.395 5.130 
12 Mkt6-Central nerve system 5.889 5.694 
13 Mkt8-Gastrointestinals 6.570 6.544 
14 Mkt9-Metaboics/Nutrients 5.773 5.638 
15 Mkt10-Hormone 6.798 6.485 
16 Mkt12-Skin 7.063 7.063 
17 Mkt14-Oncolytics 7.697 7.648 
18 Mkt16-Relief of pain 6.254 6.165 
19 Mkt18-Respiratory tract 6.261 6.163 
20 Firm Stages  .684* 
 Constant 69.611 89.003 
    
 Observations 193 193 
 Log Likelihood -116.417 -114.241 
 Chi-Square (d.f.) 30.93(19)* 35.28(20)* 
 Pseudo R-Square .117 .134 
 Change in Chi-Square (d.f.)  4.35(1)* 
† p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
In both regressions, model 1 is the control variables only model and model 2 is the 
full model that includes Firm Stages. Self-selection bias is controlled by lambda. The 
regression on technology related entry (Table 6.5) shows a significant control model (p<.001). 
Several control variables, particularly market size and market density, are strongly associated 
with the relatedness of technology (p<.001 and p<.001 respectively). Firms are less likely to 
enter related technology in their second product when their first product enjoys a large 
market size. And firms are more likely to enter related technology when their first product 
has high level of market density. Firm stages, however, is not found to be a significant factor 
associate with technology related entry. 
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The regression on market related entry (Table 6.6) shows the control only model is 
significant at .05 level. However, none of the control variables have significant effects 
individually. The full model was also significant (p<.05) and this model significantly 
improves model fit over the control model (p<.05). This result, in combination with the 
significant positive coefficient of firm stages (p<.05), lends support to hypothesis 4b. New 
ventures seem to be more likely to enter related markets.  
Summary: H2 and H4 are two sets of competing hypotheses. The results seem to lend 
more support on the view that new ventures are more likely to use experience to guide their 
diversification. However, this result was only found for market experience, not for 
technology experience. New ventures were more likely to enter a second product-market that 
is related to their existing market.  
In the next section, I examine not only the first diversification, but all the new 
product-market entries firms made. The remaining hypotheses are tested.  
 
Direction of New Product-market Entries 
 
As in the previous section, this analysis contains 199 firms. Since the level of analysis 
is each product market entry, the sample size is the actual events of entries. There are 4329 
entry events. In order to estimate the conditional logit model, data was transformed into 
82251 unique combinations of entry event-market choices (the product of 4329 entry events 
and 19 market fields) and 25974 unique combinations of entry event-technology choices (the 
product of 4329 entry events and 6 technology fields). Two sets of regressions are conducted 
to explore the choice of market and the choice of technology.  
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Technology Choices 
 This set of analysis use technology choice as the dependent variable. The 
descriptive statistics appear in table 6.7. Correlations are presented in table 6.8. Conditional 
logit regression is used to analyze firm choices on technology in their new product-market 
entries. The hypotheses tested in this section are summarized in table 6.9, and the regression 
results are shown in Appendix V. The highlights of the results are provided in table 6.10. 
 
Table 6.7  Descriptive Statistics – Technology Choices 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
1 Choice .17 .37 
2 Technology Product Density 393.28 562.21 
3 Technology Product Entry 40.84 53.53 
4 Technology Firm Density 41.19 31.79 
5 Technology Firm Entry 13.69 12.69 
6 Technology Experience 7.64 25.23 
7 Firm Age 38.02 40.25 
8 Firm Size 45.85 56.72 
9 Technology Exploration 1.00 1.09 
10 Firm Independence .80 .40 
11 Innovative knowledge .73 .44 
12 Firm Stages .29 .45 
N=25974 
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Table 6.8  Correlations – Technology Choices 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Technology 
Choice 
           
2 Technology 
Product Density 
.44*           
3 Technology 
Product Entry 
.50* .75*          
4 Technology Firm 
Density 
.45* .94* .75*         
5 Technology Firm 
Entry 
.50* .77* .97* .81*        
6 Technology 
Experience 
.53* .48* .37* .47* .39*       
7 Firm Age .00 .03* -.02* .04* -.02* .03*      
8 Firm Size .00 .14* -.03* .16* -.02* .37* .07*     
9 Technology 
Knowledge 
Breadth 
.00 .10* -.03* .12* -.02* .16* .27* .43*    
10 Firm 
Independence 
.00 .02* -.00 .02* -.00 .05* .04* .12* -.02*   
11 Innovative 
knowledge 
.00 -.00 -.02* -.00 -.02* .11* .20* .28* .13* -.03*  
12 Firm Stages .00 .04* .00 .04* .01 .03* -.49* .07* -.12* -.11* .05* 
*p<.05 
 
 
Table 6.9  Summary of Hypotheses – Technology Choices 
H1a: Firms are more likely to enter product-markets that relate to their technology experience. 
H3a: The older the firms, the more likely they will enter product-markets that relate to their technology 
experience. 
 
H5a: The older the firms, the less likely they will enter product-markets that relate to their technology 
experience. 
 
H6a: Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter product-markets where many 
competitors have adopted the technology. 
H7a: The broader the firms’ technology knowledge, the less likely they will enter product-markets relate to 
their technology experience. 
H8a: Firms that have access to innovative knowledge are less likely to enter product-market relate to their 
technology experience.  
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Table 6.10  Highlights of Conditional Logit Regression on Technology Choices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Technology Density  (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)** 
Technology Experience    (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
Technology Experience* 
Age 
    (-)***   
Technology Density* 
Firm Stages 
  (-)***     
Technology Experience* 
Tech. Knowledge Breadth 
     (-)***  
Technology Experience* 
Innovative Knowledge 
      (-)*** 
Control Variables ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
        
Log Likelihood -5660 -5076 -4839 -3203 -3192 -2989 -3134 
Chi-Square (d.f.) 4139.1(12)*** 5362(16)*** 5834.6(22)*** 9106.6(17)*** 9128.4(18)*** 9534.6(23)*** 9245.2(23)***
McFadden’s R-Square .270 .346 .376 .587 .588 .615 .596 
Change in Chi-Square (d.f.)  (2) vs (1) 
1223(4)*** 
(3) vs (2) 
472.6(6)*** 
(4) vs (2) 
3744.6(1)*** 
(5) vs (4) 
21.8(1)*** 
(6)vs (4) 
428 (6)*** 
(8)vs(4) 
138.6(6)*** 
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Model 1 is the control only model. Model 2 adds market effect. The significant 
improvement of model fit (p<.001) suggests that the market factors can significantly explain 
the direction of diversification. In particular, technology density and technology entrants in a 
specific technology both show consistent significant effects across all the models. The 
positive sign of coefficients suggests firms are more likely to enter product-markets where 
the technology has been widely adopted by other firms. 
Model 3 added the interaction effect between firm stages and technology density. The 
model is significant (p<.001) and significantly improves model fit over model 2 (p<.001). 
The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant (p<.001), suggesting new 
ventures are less likely to enter product-markets with high technology adoption. This result 
provides strong support for hypotheses 6a. 
Model 4 adds firm technology experience. The comparison between model 4 and 
model 2 indicates firm experience can significantly explain the direction of firm 
diversification above and beyond control and market variables (chi-square change with 
p<.001). In specific, experience in a specific technology field has a positive association with 
firm likelihood of entering that field (p<.001), yielding strong support for hypotheses 1a. 
Model 5 to 7 added the interaction effect to firm technology experience. Model 5 is a 
test of age as a moderator on the relationship between technology experience and technology 
choice. Model 6 tests firm technology knowledge breadth as a moderator of the relationship 
between technology experience and technology choice. Model 7 tests the moderating effect 
of access to innovative knowledge.  A significant interaction effect was found because each 
model lead to a significant improvement (all p<.001) in model fit compared to the main 
effect model (model 4). 
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Factors interact with the relationship between experience and product-market entry all 
received strong support. In model 5, the interaction between firm technology experience and 
firm age is negative and significant (p<.001), suggesting older firms are less bounded by 
experience when they choose new technology fields. Thus hypothesis 5a is supported and 
hypothesis 3a is not supported.  In model 6, significant interaction is also found (p<.001) 
between technology experience and technology knowledge breadth. The negative coefficient 
indicate exploration activities can reduce firm path-dependency on past technology 
experience. This provides strong support for hypothesis 7a. Hypothesis 8a is supported by the 
significant negative coefficient (p<.001) of the product term of technology experience and 
innovative knowledge. Firms with innovative knowledge are less likely to choose technology 
that they already know.  
Summary: For technology choices, most hypotheses are supported. The interaction 
effect of technology density and firm stages is found. The main effect of experience on 
product-market choice received strong support, as well as the interaction effects of age, 
technology knowledge breadth and innovative knowledge. Between the two competing 
hypotheses on the moderating effect of age, the negative moderating effect was supported. 
These results confirm that older firms are less likely to be constrained by past experience and 
more likely to explore new technology. 
 
Market Choices 
The descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in table 6.11 and table 6.12 . 
And the regression results are summarized in table 6.13.  The highlights of results are 
reported in table 6.14, and full results are available in Appendix VI. 
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Table 6.11  Descriptive Statistics – Market Choices 
 Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
1 Market Choice .05 .22 
2 Market Density 124.19 164.47 
3 Market Entry 12.90 16.46 
4 Market Size 2310014 3749785 
5 Market Experience 2.41 6.59 
6 Firm Age 38.02 40.25 
7 Firm Size 45.85 56.71 
8 Market Knowledge Breadth 6.59 4.45 
9 Firm Independence .80 .40 
10 Innovative knowledge .73 .44 
11 Firm Stages .29 .45 
N=82251 
 
 
Table 6.12  Correlations – Market Choices 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Market Choice           
2 Market Density .19*          
3 Market Entry .25* .65*         
4 Market Size .14* .81* .49*        
5 Market Experience .20* .49* .33* .35*       
6 Firm Age .00 .03* -.02* .03* .03*      
7 Firm Size .00 .14* -.03* .14* .45* .07*     
8 Market Knowledge 
Breadth 
.00 .16* -.01* .16* .36* -.01* .80*    
9 Firm Independence .00 .02* -.00 .02* .06* .04* .12* -.00   
10 Innovative 
Knowledge 
.00 -.00 -.02* -.01* .13* .20* .28* .27* -.03*  
11 Firm Stages .00 .04* .00 .05* .03* -.49* .07* .13* -.11* .05* 
* P< .05 
 
Table 6.13  Summary of Hypotheses – Market Choices 
H1b: Firms are more likely to enter product-markets that relate to their market experience. 
H3b: The older the firms, the more likely they will enter product-markets that relate to their market 
experience. 
H5b: The older the firms, the less likely they will enter product-markets that relate to their market 
experience. 
H6b: Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter product-markets where many 
competitors have served the market. 
H7b: The broader the firms’ market knowledge, the less likely they will enter product-markets relate to 
their market experience. 
H8b: Firms that have access to innovative knowledge are less likely to enter product-market relate to their 
market experience.  
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Table 6.14  Highlights of Conditional Logit Regression on Market Choices 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Market Density  (+) (+)* (-) (-) (+) (-)† 
Market Experience    (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
Market Experience* Age     (-)   
Market Density* 
Firm Stages 
  (-)***     
Market Experience* Market 
Knowledge Breadth 
     (-)***  
Market Experience* 
Innovative Knowledge 
      (-)*** 
Control Variables ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
        
Log Likelihood -10714 -10235 -10121 -9815 -9815 -9581 -10235 
Chi-Square (d.f.) 4064.3(57)*** 5023.7(60)*** 5250.2(79)*** 5863.6(61)*** 5863.6(62)*** 6330.3(82)*** 5023.7(60)***
McFadden’s R-Square .159 .197 .206 .23 .23 .248 .197 
Change in Chi-Square (d.f.)  (2) vs. (1) 
959.4(3)*** 
(3) vs. 2 
226.5(19)*** 
(4) vs. (2) 
839.9(1)*** 
(5) vs. (4) 
0(1) 
(6) vs. (4) 
466.7(21)*** 
(2) vs. (1) 
959.4(3)*** 
 † p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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In table 6.14, the first model is a control model with three control variables, firm age, 
firm size and lambda (self-selection bias). This model is significant (P<.001). The second 
model includes variables accessing market conditions. The change in chi-square statistic over 
the based model (model1) is highly significant (p<.001). The coefficient of market entrants is 
positive and significant (p<.001), suggesting firms are more likely to choose a market that has 
higher number of new entrants. To test the moderating effect of venture status on the 
relationship between market density and market choice, model 3 added venture firm stages and 
the interaction term of firm stages and market density. The interaction effect is confirmed by 
the negative and significant coefficient of the product term (p<.001), and a significant 
improvement in model fit (p<.001). Thus hypothesis 6a is supported. 
In model 4, where I include the variable of firm market experience, there is a 
significant improvement in the model fit over the last model (p<.001), indicating firm 
experience can explain product-market choice above and over control and market factors. The 
coefficient of market experience, as hypothesized was positive and significant (p<.001), 
yielding strong support for hypotheses 1b. To check the moderating effect of firm age, model 5 
added the interaction effect. However, this product term is not significant. Thus neither 
hypothesis 3b nor hypothesis 5b is supported. Model 6 added the moderating effect of market 
knowledge breadth. This model results in a significant improvement of model fit over model 4 
(p<.001), and the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant (p<.001), 
suggesting firm market knowledge breadth negatively moderates the impact of firm market 
experience on market choice. Thus hypothesis 7b is supported. Finally, Model 7 tests the 
moderating effect of having innovative knowledge on the relationship between firm market 
experience and market choice. The significant chi-square change (p<.001) over model 4 
indicates a significant improvement in model fit. The interaction term was negative and 
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significant (p<.001), supporting hypothesis 8a. Firms that also have innovative knowledge rely 
are less likely to select a market where they have high level of experience.  
Summary: In sum, hypotheses on the market choices were supported, except hypothesis 
3b and 5b.  I did not find a significant moderating effect of age on market choice. New 
ventures are less likely to choose high-density market to enter than established firms. Firms 
tend to choose markets that they have more experience with. And as they age, this tendency 
doesn’t change. When firms have broad market knowledge, their market choices are less 
bounded by past experience. Access to innovative knowledge also reduces the constraints of 
firm market experience in firm new product-market choices.  
 
Summary 
 
Overall, the regression on market and technology choices both provide strong support 
for my hypotheses. Compared to established ventures, new ventures are less likely to enter 
product market with high market density and technology density. Both market experience and 
technology experience are found to be a significant factor in explaining the choice of product-
market. Firms tend to enter new product-markets where they have higher level of experience. 
Age was found to have a negative moderating effect on the relationship between prior 
technology experience and technology choice. This finding lends support to the argument that 
older firms have a greater likelihood to break away from local search and enter distant 
knowledge fields. However, the moderating effect of age only exists for the choice of 
technology, but not for the choice of market, indicating there might be differences between 
market and technology experience. Other moderators have consistent effect on both technology 
and market choices.  
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Above I report three sets of analysis on all the hypotheses.  Results of all the 
hypotheses are summarized in the following table. Further discussion of these findings and an 
exploration of their interrelationships is provided in the final chapter. 
 
Table 6.15  Summary of the Results 
Hypotheses Results 
H1a: Firms are more likely to enter product-markets relate to their technology 
experience. 
Supported 
H1b: Firms are more likely to enter product-markets relate to their market 
experience 
Supported 
H2a: Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter 
product-markets that relate to their technology experience.  
Not supported  
H2b: Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter 
product-markets that relate to their market experience. 
Not supported 
H3a: The older the firms, the more likely they will enter product-markets that 
relate to their technology experience. 
Not supported 
H3b: The older the firms, the more likely they will enter product-markets that 
relate to their market experience. 
Not supported 
H4a: Compared to established firms, new ventures are more likely to enter 
product-markets that relate to their technology experience.  
Not supported 
H4b: Compared to established firms, new ventures are more likely to enter 
product-markets that relate to their market experience. 
Supported 
H5a: The older the firms, the less likely they will enter product-markets that 
relate to their technology experience. 
Supported 
H5b: The older the firms, the less likely they will enter product-markets that 
relate to their market experience. 
Not supported 
H6a: Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter 
product-markets where many competitors have adopted the technology. 
Supported 
H6b: Compared to established firms, new ventures are less likely to enter 
product-markets where many competitors have served the market. 
Supported 
H7a: The broader the firms’ technology knowledge, the less likely they will enter 
product-markets relate to their technology experience. 
Supported 
H7b: The broader the firms’ market knowledge, the less likely they will enter 
product-markets relate to their market experience. 
Supported 
H8a: Firms that have access to innovative knowledge are less likely to enter 
product-markets relate to their technology experience.  
Supported 
H8b: Firms that have access to innovative knowledge are less likely to enter 
product-markets relate to their market experience. 
Supported 
  
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This chapter contains three parts. First, a discussion of the research findings is 
presented. Second, implications of this study for theory and practice are discussed. 
Finally, the limitations of this study and suggestions for future research are provided. 
 
Discussion of Research Findings 
 
This study set out to develop a model of organizational product-market entry by 
building on the learning and evolutionary theory of the firm. In my model, each product-
line is viewed as a set of knowledge and routines. Firms can either enter product-markets 
that use a similar set of knowledge as their existing products, or they can enter product-
markets that use a different set of knowledge from their existing products. Diversification 
is modeled as such a search and learning process aiming at exploiting existing knowledge 
or exploring new knowledge.  
Diversification as well as learning and evolutionary literature predicts knowledge 
exploitation and related product-market entry are more common among organizations, 
especially as they accumulate experience in a certain area (Martin & Mitchell, 1998; 
Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991; Chang, 1996; Ingram & Baum, 1997; Levinthal & 
Myatt, 1994; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi & Winter, 1994). However, studies also suggest firms 
do enter distant product-markets and accumulation of experience could lead to 
exploration (Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Stuart & Podolny, 1996; Helfat and Raubitschek, 
2000).  The goal of this study is to solve this paradox by providing a better understanding 
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of diversification as a learning and evolutionary process. I argue organizational context is 
the key to the puzzle because learning is not a homogenous process. First, previous 
literature largely builds on the studies of very large and mature organizations that have 
survived the turmoil of early organizational stages and little attention is paid to the 
differences between organizational stages (i.e. new ventures vs. mature firms).  With a 
unique sample that contain very young, mid-aged and very mature organizations, I 
studied the interaction between organizational stages and diversification pattern. 
Secondly, I explored specific organizational features that might help organizations 
overcome learning path-dependency and facilitate knowledge exploration. Two features 
examined in this study are internal knowledge structure and external knowledge access. 
As the result, this study yields insight into both the diversification literature and the 
literature on organizational learning and evolution.  
A two-stage research design employing both qualitative and quantitative data 
gathering was used in this study. The first stage employed qualitative case study to define 
and develop the construct and model of new venture diversification. This initial phase 
helped to enrich the understanding of the diversification strategy in new ventures, 
identify the key dimension of learning in the diversification process, and validate the 
construct used in the second stage of the research. The second stage of the research used 
a longitudinal archival dataset and provided tests of the relationship hypothesized in the 
model. The archival data were collected from population of 285 pharmaceutical firms 
marketed generic drugs in the US between 1984-2004. 
The following sections summarize and discuss the research findings presented in 
Chapter Six. First, insights into the differences of diversification pattern between new 
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ventures and established firms are discussed. Second, the factors that influence product-
market entry direction and facilitate distant search are identified. Finally, the differences 
between the technology dimension and the market dimension of experience are presented.  
 
Organizational Stages and Diversification Patterns 
 
 Research on diversification seldom distinguishes the differences between new and 
mature organizations. Since most studies employ samples of large established firms, their 
findings may not reflect the reality of early stage firms. Perhaps the most important 
finding of this study is that new ventures and established firms behave differently and 
have different diversification patterns. 
 First, the relationship between experience and diversification is influenced by 
firm stages. Two sets of competing hypotheses compared new and mature firms, and the 
view that aging increases the likelihood of exploration received stronger support. 
Established firms are founded to be less constrained by their experience and more likely 
to enter product-markets that are distant from their experience. This finding is further 
supported by the similar results using age as indicator of firm growth. Aging negatively 
moderate the relationship between experience and product-market entry, reducing the 
likelihood that firms enter product-markets related to their past experience. This finding 
lends support to the “liability of newness” (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Stinchcombe, 1965) 
argument in organization ecology, and the slack search (Cyert & March, 1963) in the 
behavioral theory of the firm. Older firms seem to have greater resources and capability 
to diversify into new knowledge fields. However, their exploration of new knowledge 
may not all be intentional, but could be by-products of “liability of aging” (Barron, West 
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and Hannan, 1984). As I presented in the hypotheses development, failing to interpret and 
remember the experience, which are liabilities associated with aging, might as well lead 
to exploration.  
This finding also suggests new firms are more constrained by their experience. 
This might be traced to two causes. First is the limited resource and experience of 
younger firms, which makes experimentation with new knowledge difficult. In addition, 
the bias and heuristics of early stage leaders might also play a role in the persistence of 
initial routines. Two learning models of new ventures were presented during hypotheses 
development. One model suggests new ventures use trial-and-error learning and 
experiment with a variety of strategies (McGrath, 1995; Nicholls-Nixon, Cooper & Woo, 
2000). The other argues entrepreneurs have strong mental model and tend to persist in the 
strategy they believe in (Hayward, Shepherd & Griffin, 2006; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995). 
When the initial strategy brings success, the strategy will be reinforced. When the initial 
strategy fails, the entrepreneur will still interpret result favorability because they are 
overconfident about their control over the outcome. The results of this study provide 
support to the latter view.  
 Second, organizational stages might also influence the relationship between 
experience and diversification because new and established organizations learn from 
other firms differently. The results show that new ventures tend to be early entrants to a 
product-market, while established firms like to enter crowded product-markets. This 
suggests new ventures are more innovative and less likely to imitate other’s experience. 
This finding, coupled with the finding that new ventures are more likely to rely on their 
own experience, indicate new ventures might have a stronger internal focus in their 
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learning process. New ventures enter a product-market early because they have a higher 
tolerance (McGrath, MacMillan & Scheinberg, 1992), or a lower estimate (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997) of the market uncertainty. Both are likely to be the results of 
overconfidence about their internal capability and overlooking external environment.  
 The differing focus of new ventures and established firms also received support 
from another finding of this study. In the examination of factors that influence the 
decision to diversify, I found firm technology and market experience play a critical role 
in determine the likelihood of diversification for new ventures, but not for established 
firms. The internal focus of new ventures can be traced to two sources. First, their limited 
resources and competence limit new ventures to the leverage of their existing experiences 
because learning new knowledge from other is more expensive.  Secondly, research has 
shown that new ventures are less comprehensive in their environmental scanning 
compared to mature organizations (Mohan-Neill, 1995; Birley, Norburn & MacMillan, 
1985).  The limited ability to learn external environment and competitors might also 
contribute to the internal focus of the new organization. 
 
Factors Influencing Diversification Direction 
 
The preceding section discusses results that highlight product-market entry 
differences between new ventures and mature organizations. Another major interest of 
this study is to understand the condition and context under which distant search might 
happen. While local search is common, an organization that engages exclusively in local 
search faces the danger of obsolescence (Levinthal & March, 1993). Distant search 
provide firms the opportunity to reconfigure and upgrade their knowledge base, which is 
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particularly important in a dynamic environment. In this study, findings suggest four 
major factors that could influence the direction of new product-market entry.  
The first factor is firm past performance. There are two possible effect of 
performance on the direction of diversification. First, as behavioral theories suggests, 
performance below aspiration level will increase firm search activity (Cyert & March, 
1963), leading to greater likelihood of risk-taking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Thus 
low performance may lead to exploration into distant product-markets. However, when 
firm performance is good, firm may also increase search distance because increased 
organizational resources allow experimentation (Cyert & March, 1963). In this study, I 
found firms are more likely to enter product-market distant from their past experience 
when their first product enjoys a large market size and low market density. Both larger 
size and low density indicate the product has good performance due to large market share 
and low competition. So the findings in this study point out good performance might be 
the antecedents of distant search.  
The second factor influencing diversification direction discussed in this study is 
experience. The finding of this study confirmed the arguments of local search (March & 
Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Firms have a strong tendency to enter new 
product-markets that closely related to their previous product-markets. This result is 
consistent for both technology and market experience. 
Perhaps the more interesting findings of this study are the identification of two 
organizational features that could reduce the constraints of past experience and promote 
entries into distant product-markets. The first organizational feature examined in this 
study is the breadth of organizational knowledge. Here the knowledge breadth is 
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measured by number of distinct knowledge areas a firm has entered in the past. I found 
the broader the firm’s knowledge base, the less likely that the firm will enter product-
markets related to their pervious knowledge. This result is consistent for both technology 
and market knowledge. This finding indicates a useful mechanism for organizations to 
overcome learning path-dependency is to broaden their knowledge base.  With a wide 
range of knowledge elements, firms can recombine and create linkages, providing 
opportunities for new knowledge to emerge. Moreover, firms with a wide knowledge 
base gained ability to manage diverse activities. These firms are more open-minded to 
new knowledge and less likely to fall into the competency trap from specialization. This 
finding lends support to the idea that pooling diverse knowledge sources is a key feature 
of “dynamic capability” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  
The other organizational feature examined in this study is the access to innovative 
knowledge.  Firms with access to innovative knowledge are found to be less likely to 
enter related product-markets. This finding suggests assimilating external knowledge is 
another useful mechanism to avoid the trap of local search.  Previous studies have 
examined many kinds of linkages to external environment. For example, alliances are 
formal linkages that connect focal firm to other firms (Suart & Podolny, 1996; Powell, 
Koput & Simth-Doerr, 1996), while individuals who maintain active communication with 
external environment are informal linkages (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Katz & 
Tushman, 1981). The finding of this study shows another type of linkage: linkage 
between two businesses.  It is beneficial for generic pharmaceutical firms to also 
participate in innovative (that is, patent based) drug business. Although generic and 
innovative drugs use very different business models, there are many synergistic linkages 
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between them. Firms participate in innovative drug business usually invest more in R&D, 
emphasize more on risk-taking and innovation, and tend to be at the frontier of the 
pharmaceutical research. All these seem to benefit generic business and provide 
opportunities for generic business to become more innovative and enter distant new 
product-markets. 
In sum, prior performance, experience, knowledge breadth and access to 
innovative knowledge are factors highlighted by this research. Experience in a certain 
area decreases diversifications distant from that area. Good prior performance can 
provide organizational slack that encourages distant search. A broad knowledge base and 
access to innovative knowledge can reduce an organization’s reliance on past experience, 
facilitating entry into distant product-markets. 
 
The Technology and Market Dimension of Experience 
 
The final set of relationships explored in this study examined the impact of two 
dimensions of experience, technology experience and market experience. Previous 
studies of experience usually focus on the technology dimension. In this study, I also 
include market dimensions in the analysis. Interestingly, technology experience and 
market experience show different results, indicating two types of experience have distinct 
impact on diversification. 
 The examination of a firm’s first diversification reveals new ventures are more 
likely to enter related market areas, but not related technology areas, compared to 
established firms. This might because market specialized assets are more difficult to 
replicate than technology assets (Mitchell, 1989).  Entering a new market area requires 
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the understanding of a new group of customers, hiring new sales people and building new 
contacts. Many of these not only are expensive to acquire, but also take time to build. 
New ventures with limited resources thus are less likely to enter a new market requiring 
new market knowledge.  
 In the analysis of aging and diversification, differences between technology and 
market experience were also found. Increase in age decreases the likelihood of entering 
into related technology fields, but does not decrease the likelihood of entering into related 
market fields. This finding further supports market experience produces stronger inertia 
and path-dependency than technology experience.  
 This set of findings has important implications. It demonstrates not all types of 
experience are alike. Moreover, market experience produces stronger constraints on 
change than technology experience. The difference between technology and market 
experience might relate the degree of tacitness of these two types of experience. While 
having a tacit component such as research staff and manufacturing employees, 
technology knowledge is more about production equipment, process and patents. Market 
knowledge involves less of these tangible and codifiable components. Most market 
knowledge is imbedded in people, contacts and relationships. This knowledge is difficult 
to codify and transfer. A good example of the tacit nature of market knowledge is firm’s 
reliance on the expertise of specific individual. Losing a star sales employee might 
directly result in losing a big group of customers. The more tacit the knowledge, the less 
the likelihood for knowledge recombination (Galunic & Rodan, 1998). So market 
knowledge might have higher stickiness than technology knowledge. New market 
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knowledge is more difficult to learn. And once a set of market expertise is established, it 
is less likely to be changed and transferred. 
 
Implications for Theory and Practice 
 
This research contributes to theory and practice in several ways. Specific 
theoretical and practical contributions of this study are outlined in the following sections. 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
 
Organizational Theory 
 
 First, this study contributes to organizational theory by investigating when and 
how organizations change. The study integrates learning and evolutionary perspectives 
with organizational theory to understand diversification in different firm stages, making 
contributions to the understanding of both theories. 
This study contributes to learning and evolutionary perspective by pointing out 
the heterogeneity of learning in organizations. In particular, this study argues 
organizational characteristics will moderate the learning process by affecting how 
organizations perceive, recognize, and record their experience. This integration provides 
critical insights into the relationship between experience and learning. As I have noted in 
previous chapters, some research argues accumulation of experience can lead to 
exploitation (local search), while other suggests experience is associated with exploration 
(distant search). The key to solve this puzzle, as suggested by this study, is organizational 
context. Certain organizational characteristics can hinder experiential learning (i.e. 
   
 113
complexity, size, age), and enhance exploration, thus increasing the chance of path-
breaking change.  
This study also contributes to organizational theory by linking the age-dependent 
argument to the phenomena of organization product-market entry. The nature of the 
relationship between aging and organizational behavior is an important unresolved issue 
in organizational theory (Hannan, 1998). The two theories of organizational ecology, 
“liability of newness” and “liability of aging”, have opposite views on the effect of aging. 
Most studies in ecology focus on how aging affect firm survival, and few directly study 
aging and firm behavior (see Sorensen and Stuart (2000) for an exception). Even fewer 
have examined aging and diversification. In this study, I developed arguments on how 
aging would affect firm learning, and thus lead to different patterns of diversification, 
thus enriched the understanding of the relationship between aging and organizational 
behavior. 
 
Diversification 
 
Secondly, this study also contributes to the literature on diversification in several 
ways.  First and for most, this study fills a gap in diversification literature by examining 
the different diversification patterns of new and established firms. Large amount of 
previous research on diversification either used samples of large established firms (e.g. 
fortune 500 firm or public traded firms), or do not distinguish between firm stages. The 
assumption that diversification is homogenous across all organizational stages leads to 
severe biases because firms at different stages have critical differences (Miller & Friesen, 
1984). This study uses a unique dataset that include very young, mid-age, and very old 
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firms, demonstrates that organizations at different stages diversify in very different 
patterns. 
Secondly, by adopting the learning and evolutionary perspective, this study 
provides a new insight into diversification phenomena, drawing attention to the role of 
knowledge and learning in firm change and expansion. Previous literatures on 
diversification borrow heavily from resource-based view of the firm, which argues firms 
diversify to leverage their underutilized resources. This perspective strongly suggests 
firms will and should diversify into related product-markets to better utilize their excess 
resources. However, if diversification is to exploit existing resources, how then can firms 
update their resource s and capabilities? Because firms some times do enter markets 
outside their existing resource profile, we need a new perspective to explain when and 
how firms conduct path-breaking change. Viewing diversification as an organizational 
search and learning process provide a better understanding of firm diversification. As a 
search process, diversification can be exploitive to apply existing resources, it can also be 
explorative to gain new resources and reconfigure their resource profile.  
 
Learning and evolutionary perspective 
 
This study also provides two contributions to the learning and evolutionary 
perspective in specific. First, this study contributes to the development of “dynamic 
capability (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) ” concept by providing two concrete examples 
of  “dynamic capability”. Previous literature uses theoretical models and cases to 
illustrate the existence of dynamic capabilities (e.g. Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000), or 
implies the existence of dynamic capabilities through studying the relationship between 
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certain organizational practices and organizational performance (e.g. Henderson & 
Cockburn, 1994; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996).  Concrete examples of dynamic 
capabilities, and how they affect organizational knowledge and learning, are not widely 
documented. My analysis directly tested certain organizational features and their impact 
on firm behavior. This study points out broad organizational knowledge and access to 
innovative knowledge are examples of dynamic capability because they can reduce firm 
learning path-dependency and facilitate distant search.  
Furthermore, by highlighting the importance of products to the resources and 
capabilities of firms, the study contributes to the measurement of organizational 
knowledge and experience. Most studies examining organizational search and learning 
through the use of patent data (e.g. Nerkar & Roberts, 2004; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; 
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). This approach allows measurement of organizational 
technology knowledge. However, because not all knowledge can be patented, patents 
capture only a portion of firms’ market and production knowledge, and only a minority of 
organizations. In this study, I use knowledge imbedded in products to capture 
organizational knowledge and experience. There are two benefits of doing so. First, every 
organization has to offer certain products. Examining knowledge in products allows 
greater generalizability. Secondly, products have a technology and a market dimension, 
so both technology and market knowledge can be captured. 
 
Entrepreneurship 
 
This study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by explaining the 
evolution process of new ventures. The creation of new businesses and that pursuit and 
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management of growth are two behaviors that distinguish entrepreneurship from other 
general management activity (Arbaugh & Camp, 2000). In entrepreneurship research, a 
vast amount of attention has been paid to founding events, while the literature on new 
venture growth remains limited (Arbaugh & Camp, 2000; Davidsson & Wiklund, 2000). 
This study fills this gap by examining how new ventures grow through establishing 
diversified products.  
This study also enriches the understanding of new ventures’ behavior, especially 
their learning patterns. Two learning models have been offered in the literature. One 
model presents the adaptable entrepreneurs, and the other suggests the persistent 
entrepreneurs. This study lends greater support to the latter model, suggesting new 
ventures’ learning and decision-making are subject to biases and heuristics of their 
leaders. The cognitive biases that lead to their devotion to initial strategies also limit their 
ability to learn from others. So learning and cognition play an important role in the new 
venture development process. 
 
Practical Contributions 
 
In clarifying the antecedents of product-market market entry choice, this research 
provides insights to practitioners regarding how firms should manage product 
diversification to achieve the balance between exploration and exploitation. As suggested 
by this study, experience creates strong path-dependency and encourages related entries. 
So firms need to be cautious that they do not fall into the “competency trap”. This study 
also suggested two practices that help firm overcome the local search tendency, and 
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explore into new knowledge areas. First, managers could broaden the firm’s internal 
knowledge base. And second, firms could build external linkages.  
In addition, entrepreneurs and mangers must consider the firms’ core technology, 
as well as market in their growth and expansion.  Both technology and market can 
become the leveraging point for new product introduction. However, market experience 
might create greater constraints. Firms need to pay attention to the learning inertia in the 
market area. 
For entrepreneurs, this study points out the danger of over exploiting early 
knowledge and experiences. Compared to established firms, new ventures are more likely 
to enter related product-markets. Although this exploitation can improve firm efficiency, 
it also prevent firm from learning new knowledge. When the early knowledge doesn’t fit, 
persistency can be particularly dangerous. Entrepreneurs with an open mind will better 
prosper in the dynamic environment. 
Finally, this study provides direct implications for generic pharmaceutical firms. 
In the competitive environment of generic pharmaceutical industry, the ability to 
introduce new drugs is particularly important for firm survival. This study found 
participating in the innovative drug development would enhance the firm’s capability to 
learn new knowledge, and introduce drugs different than their previous products. While it 
is not practical for every firm to start innovative drug research, generic pharmaceutical 
companies could build connections with innovative drug businesses in order to improve 
the ability to meet the challenge of the dynamic environment. 
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
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Several limitations of this study should be noticed. Suggestions for future research 
that can address these limitations are also discussed in this section. 
First, I examined the factors influencing new product-market choice in a single 
industry, which may reduce the generalizability of the findings. The generic 
pharmaceutical industry represents a regulated industry with relatively low research 
investments. In this study, product-market entries are those that approved by FDA. Firms 
may also intend to introduce a product but failed to get approval, and these drugs are not 
included in the analysis. Although the bias from this discrepancy should be low because 
of the high approval rate of generic drugs, other industries without regulation might see 
greater distant search and experimentation. Furthermore, the technology knowledge for 
generic pharmaceutical firms is mostly production knowledge since patents are not 
necessary for products in this industry. Other industries with heavy R&D and patenting 
activity might see less distant search in technology. Future research can test the model in 
other industries. 
Secondly, this study captures the firm’s knowledge base from products. The 
assumption is that these products are developed within the firm. However, some products 
might not be internally developed, but are outsourced or acquired externally. A 
knowledge component that is generated internally of the organization usually requires 
greater organizational commitment because organizational members participated in the 
knowledge creation. On the other hand, if a knowledge component is gained external of 
the firm, the firm will have less commitment to retain and reinvest in it. So the mode of 
knowledge development could influence the direction of diversification.  
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With few exceptions (e.g. Chatterjee & Singh, 1999; Nagarajan & Mitchell, 1998; 
Busija, O’Neill & Zeithaml, 1997), most studies to date studied types of diversification 
and modes of diversification in isolation. In fact, the issue of governance (the mode of 
product-market entry) and the issue of competence (the direction of product-market entry) 
should both be considered in the analysis (Williamson, 1999).  Future research could 
explore the how knowledge development mode interacts with the relationship between 
experience and new product-market entries.  
Finally, the measures of knowledge and experience used in this study are still 
coarse. For example, market knowledge is captured by the therapeutic area of the drug. A 
more direct and finer grained measure could be the expertise of firm sales force.  
Similarly, this study proposed two organizational features and argues these features can 
lead to knowledge recombination that facilitate distant search. It would be better to 
directly measure the activity of knowledge recombination. However, the nature of 
secondary data limits my ability to study the underlying organizational process. Future 
research can integrate other research methods such as field study and questionnaire to 
address this limitation. 
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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
New Venture Growth through Product Diversification 
 
Introduction: 
This is a study conducted by Kenan-Flagler Business School at UNC-Chapel Hill.  
The project director is Xuanli Xie, Doctoral Candidate in Strategic Management. This 
project is under the supervision of Hugh O’Neill (Professor of Management at UNC). 
 
Research purpose:   
To better understand new venture product diversification in the biotech and 
pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Research Background:  
Fast-growing new ventures have drawn wide public attention because they make 
significant contribution to our economic well being through job creation and innovation. 
Despite the significance of entrepreneurial activity, the record reveals, however, that the 
majority of these start-ups fail. This suggests it is important to understand the growth 
process of new ventures because knowledge in this regard may prevent new ventures’ 
failure and improves their chance of success.  
 Firm growth is typically realized by product diversification. To evolve into well-
established firms, new ventures need to offer more lines of products and services and 
develop diverse portfolios of assets. How do new ventures search and develop their new 
products? What type of new product-market do they enter? How does new venture 
product diversification affect new venture performance? This study would like to address 
these questions to better understand new venture growth process. 
 
Research questions:  
1. How do new ventures choose their new product? What factors influence their search 
and selection of new products? 
2. How does new venture product diversification strategy affect new venture performance? 
 
Interview Questions: 
Thanks for meeting with me today. I am conducting a research project 
investigating the early diversification strategy of new ventures. I would like learn more 
about the product market strategy of your company.  
The interview will take no more than one hour. All interview contents will be 
confidential. In return for participation in this project, a summary of the results of large-
scale study will be provided. The results will be valuable to you and your firm as you 
continue to develop your venture. 
 
Do you have any questions before we start? 
 
(1) Could you please tell us about the core technology you have? 
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(2) What products are you developing? Who are the customers of your products? 
 
(3) What are their development stages? 
 
(4) What are the relationships between these products?  
             
(5)  How do you develop these products? Internal, acquisition, alliances? Why? 
 
(6)        Who are your major competitors? What advantages do you have comparing to 
your competitors? 
 
(7)        Will you consider developing additional new products? Why? 
 
 
(8)       How will you search for new products? 
Probe: Competitors? 
Probe: Leveraging technology? 
            Probe: Leveraging customer? 
 
(9)       How will you develop future new product? Internal, acquisition, alliance? 
 
 
(10) What is your strategy for growth?  
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APPENDIX II: THERAPEUTIC AREAS AND DRUG FORMS 
Market Dimension 
(Therapeutic Areas) 
Technology Dimension 
(Drug Forms/Routes) 
1. Anesthetics 
2. Antidotes 
3. Antimicrobials 
4. Hematology 
5. Cardiovascular-renal 
6. Central nerve system 
7. Contrast 
media/Radiopharmaceuticals 
8. Gastrointestinals 
9. Metaboics/Nutrients 
10. Hormones/Hormonal Mechanisms 
11. Immunologics 
12. Skin/Mucous Membranes 
13. Neurologics 
14. Oncolytics 
15. Ophthalmics 
16. Relief of pain 
17. Antiparasitics 
18. Respiratory tract 
19. Unclassified/Miscellaneous 
 
1. Oral Solid 
2. Oral Liquid 
3. Topical 
4. Injection 
5. OTIC/Ocular 
6. Others 
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APPENDIX III: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE CHOICE OF DIVERSIFICATION 
Means and Standard Deviations – The Choice of Diversification 
No Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
1 Diversification .72 .45
2 Time 1990.26 6.58
3 Firm Age 30.04 42.28
4 Year of Founding 1960.99 43.89
5 Foreign Ownership .16 .37
6 Extended Release Technology .10 .30
7 Performance 6639.38 79495.24
8 Market Size 3082705 4087790
9 Market Density 164.34 177.57
10 Market Entrants 28.91 20.08
11 Mkt1-Anesthetics  .04 .18
12 Mkt2-Antidotes .00 .06
13 Mkt3-Antimicrobials .19 .40
14 Mkt4-Hematogolics .02 .13
15 Mkt5-Cardiovascular-renal .11 .32
16 Mkt6-Central nerve system .09 .29
17 Mkt7-Contrast Media .00 .06
18 Mkt8-Gastrointestinals .05 .22
19 Mkt9-Metaboics/Nutrients .04 .20
20 Mkt10-Hormone .03 .17
21 Mkt12-Skin .10 .30
22 Mkt13-Neurologics .01 .12
23 Mkt14-Oncolytics .04 .18
24 Mkt15-Ophthalmics .02 .13
25 Mkt16-Relief of pain .12 .33
26 Mkt18-Respiratory tract .12 .33
27 Tech1-Oral solid .54 .50
28 Tech2-Oral liquid .10 .29
29 Tech3-Topical .11 .31
30 Tech4-Injection .19 .40
31 Tech5-Ocular/Otic .03 .18
32 Innovative knowledge .48 .50
33 Firm Independence .78 .41
34 Firm Stages .36 .48
N=284 
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Correlations – The Choice of Diversification 
No Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Diversification 1.00                
2 Time -.28* 1.00               
3 Time to First Product .11 -.09 1.00              
4 Year of Founding -.15* .22* -.99* 1.00             
5 Foreign Ownership -.18* .22* -.04 .07 1.00            
6 Extended Release Tech. .00 .07 -.01 .02 .01 1.00           
7 Performance -.09 -.07 -.04 .04 -.03 -.02 1.00          
8 Market Size -.25* .65* -.02 .11 .16* -.04 -.04 1.00         
9 Market Density -.22* .72* -.04 .14* .22* .09 -.07 .81* 1.00        
10 Market Entrants -.10 -.04 .04 -.05 .07 .02 -.09 .39* .43* 1.00       
11 Mkt1-Anesthetics  .03 .06 .08 -.07 .02 -.06 -.02 -.14* -.13* -.21* 1.00      
12 Mkt2-Antidotes .04 -.04 .14* -.14* -.03 -.02 .00 -.04 -.05 -.07 -.01 1.00     
13 Mkt3-Antimicrobials -.09 -.04 .19* -.19* .05 -.14* -.04 .36* .23* .49* -.09 -.03 1.00    
14 Mkt4-Hematogolics .08 .00 -.01 .01 .01 .13* -.01 -.09 -.11 -.16* -.03 -.01 -.07 1.00   
15 Mkt5- 
Cardiovascular-renal .10 .02 -.02 .03 .05 .10 -.02 .01 .23* .16* -.07 -.02 -.17* -.05 1.00  
16 Mkt6-CNS -.05 .02 -.08 .08 -.07 -.03 -.02 .19* .14* .18* -.06 -.02 -.16* -.04 -.11 1.00 
17 Mkt7-Contrast Media -.10 .09 -.02 .03 -.03 -.02 .00 -.04 -.05 -.09 -.01 .00 -.03 -.01 -.02 -.02 
18 Mkt8-Gastrointestinals -.03 .14* -.05 .07 .11 -.08 .25* -.02 -.12* -.21* -.05 -.01 -.12 -.03 -.08 -.08 
19 Mkt9-
Metaboics/Nutrients .05 .02 -.05 .05 -.04 .04 -.01 -.03 -.12* -.17* -.04 -.01 -.10 -.03 -.07 -.07 
20 Mkt10-Hormone .01 .04 -.07 .07 -.02 -.06 -.01 -.05 -.10 -.16* -.03 -.01 -.08 -.02 -.06 -.05 
21 Mkt12-Skin -.06 -.08 .01 -.02 .01 -.07 .00 -.21* -.13* -.17* -.06 -.02 -.16* -.04 -.12* -.11 
22 Mkt13-Neurologics -.06 .02 -.08 .08 -.05 .06 -.01 -.08 -.07 -.14* -.02 -.01 -.06 -.02 -.04 -.04 
23 Mkt14-Oncolytics -.05 .05 -.09 .10 .07 -.06 .00 -.13* -.12* -.20* -.04 -.01 -.09 -.03 -.07 -.06 
24 Mkt15-Ophthalmics .02 .00 -.06 .05 -.06 -.05 -.01 -.08 -.10 -.15* -.03 .01 -.07 -.02 -.05 -.04 
25 Mkt16-Relief of pain .01 .03 -.04 .04 .01 -.02 -.02 .05 .15* .12* -.07 -.02 -.18* -.05 -.13* -.12* 
26 Mkt18-Respiratory tract .09 -.16* .00 -.03 -.11 .26* -.03 -.13* -.15* -.06 -.07 -.02 -.18* -.05 -.13* -.12* 
27 Tech1-Oral solid .00 .06 -.16* .17* .08 .27* -.07 .17* .19* .25* -.21* -.06 -.06 -.04 .13* .17* 
28 Tech2-Oral liquid .01 -.01 -.02 .02 -.08 -.11 -.02 -.04 -.06 -.08 -.06 -.02 .02 -.04 -.12 .02 
29 Tech3-Topical -.06 -.11 -.04 .03 .00 -.12* .19* -.20* -.16* -.16* .06 -.02 -.11 -.05 -.12* -.11 
30 Tech4-Injection .05 .02 .22* -.21* -.02 -.17* -.03 .02 -.05 -.07 .20* .12* .17* .14* -.01 -.12* 
31 Tech5-Ocular/Otic .02 -.05 .10 -.10 -.03 -.06 -.01 -.04 -.03 -.07 -.03 -.01 .06 -.02 .00 -.06 
32 Innovative knowledge .20* -.31* .20* -.23* -.11 .05 .06 -.25* -.27* -.02 -.03 .06 -.02 .09 -.03 -.08 
33 Firm Independence -.09 .07 .06 -.05 -.15* -.08 .03 .11 .07 .01 -.09 .03 .04 .07 -.12 .07 
34 Firm Stages -.30* .27* -.49* .54* -.11 .01 .07 .15* .16* -.03 .01 -.04 -.11 -.05 -.01 .12 
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No Variable 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
17 Mkt7-Contrast Media 1.00                 
18 Mkt8-Gastrointestinals -.01 1.00                
19 Mkt9-
Metaboics/Nutrients -.01 -.05 1.00               
20 Mkt10-Hormone -.01 -.04 -.04 1.00              
21 Mkt12-Skin -.02 -.08 -.07 -.06 1.00             
22 Mkt13-Neurologics -.01 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.04 1.00            
23 Mkt14-Oncolytics -.01 -.05 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.02 1.00           
24 Mkt15-Ophthalmics -.01 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.04 -.02 -.03 1.00          
25 Mkt16-Relief of pain -.02 -.09 -.08 -.06 -.12* -.04 -.07 -.05 1.00         
26 Mkt18-Respiratory tract -.02 -.09 -.08 -.06 -.12* -.04 -.07 -.05 -.14* 1.00        
27 Tech1-Oral solid -.06 .00 .06 -.01 -.31* .11 -.09 -.14* .26* .05 1.00       
28 Tech2-Oral liquid -.02 .25* -.07 .02 -.11 -.04 -.06 -.04 -.08 .24* -.35* 1.00      
29 Tech3-Topical -.02 -.03 -.07 .01 .79* -.04 -.07 -.05 -.09 -.13* -.38* -.11 1.00     
30 Tech4-Injection .12* -.12 .07 .02 -.13* -.06 .24* -.07 -.13* -.16* -.53* -.16* -0.17* 1.00    
31 Tech5-Ocular/Otic -.01 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.02 -.03 .59* -.07 -.07 -.19* -.06 -.06 -.09 1.00   
32 Innovative knowledge -.06 -.04 -.02 .05 -.03 .07 .05 .09 .02 .03 -.07 -.02 .01 .09 .07 1.00  
33 Firm Independence -.11 .01 .11 .04 .00 -.01 -.09 -.13* .03 .04 .07 .02 .04 -.10 .00 -.11 1.00 
34 Firm Stages -.04 -.01 -.01 .05 .02 .16* .13* .07 -.01 -.10 .03 .01 .04 -.07 -.05 -.16* .01 
* P< .05 
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APPENDIX IV: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE FIRST DIVERSIFICATION 
Means and Standard Deviations – First Diversification 
No Variable Mean Std. Dev.
1 Market Related Entry .41 .49
2 Technology Related Entry .83 .37
3 Year 1990.63 6.49
4 Time to first diversification 34.21 43.47
6 Year of Founding 1956.91 44.59
7 Lambda .338 .322
8 Performance 2271.94 5893.24
9 Market Size 2444665 3046440
10 Market Density 140.16 160.14
11 Market Entrants 27.67 18.22
12 Mkt1-Anesthetics  .04 .19
13 Mkt2-Antidotes .00 .07
14 Mkt3-Antimicrobials .17 .38
15 Mkt4-Hematogolics .02 .15
16 Mkt5-Cardiovascular-renal .13 .34
17 Mkt6-Central nerve system .08 .28
18 Mkt8-Gastrointestinals .05 .22
19 Mkt9-Metaboics/Nutrients .05 .22
20 Mkt10-Hormone .03 .17
21 Mkt12-Skin .09 .28
22 Mkt13-Neurologics .01 .10
23 Mkt14-Oncolytics .03 .17
24 Mkt15-Ophthalmics .02 .14
25 Mkt16-Relief of pain .12 .33
26 Mkt18-Respiratory tract .14 .35
27 Tech1-Oral solid .54 .50
28 Tech2-Oral liquid .10 .30
29 Tech3-Topical .10 .30
30 Tech4-Injection .20 .40
31 Tech5-Ocular/Otic .03 .18
32 Firm Stages .27 .45
N=205 except for Lamda, N=199
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Correlations – First Diversification 
No Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Market Related Entry 1.00                
2 Technology Related Entry .13 1.00               
3 Year .03 .10 1.00              
4 Time to first 
diversification .16* -.04 -.08 1.00             
5 Year of Founding -.15* .05 .20* -.99* 1.00            
6 Lambda .08 .00 .42* -.07 .13 1.00           
7 Performance .10 .02 -.21* .00 -.03 -.06 1.00          
8 Market Size .09 -.07 .62* .07 .01 .45* -.19* 1.00         
9 Market Density .06 .07 .71* .01 .08 .33* -.21* .76* 1.00        
10 Market Entrants .03 -.07 -.09 .09 -.10 .17* -.13 .33* .37* 1.00       
11 Mkt1-Anesthetics  .04 .02 .09 .06 -.05 -.05 -.07 -.16* -.12 -.22* 1.00      
12 Mkt2-Antidotes -.06 .03 -.04 .15* -.15* . -.02 -.06 -.06 -.09 -.01 1.00     
13 Mkt3-Antimicrobials .13 -.22* -.07 .28* -.29* .15* -.12 .38* .17* .44* -.09 -.03 1.00    
14 Mkt4-Hematogolics -.13 .07 .03 -.02 .03 . .00 -.11 -.12 -.19* -.03 -.01 -.07 1.00   
15 Mkt5-Cardiovascular-renal -.14* .13 .07 -.03 .04 -.18* -.05 .09 .31* .18* -.08 -.03 -.18* -.06 1.00  
16 Mkt6-CNS -.07 -.06 -.05 -.09 .08 .07 .01 .06 .06 .15* -.06 -.02 -.14 -.05 -.12 1.00 
17 Mkt8-Gastrointestinals .00 -.08 .23* -.05 .08 .04 -.02 .03 -.08 -.20* -.05 -.02 -.10 -.04 -.09 -.07 
18 Mkt9-Metaboics/Nutrients -.09 .04 .04 -.05 .05 -.13 -.03 -.03 -.11 -.19* -.05 -.02 -.10 -.04 -.09 -.07 
19 Mkt10-Hormone .03 .00 .01 -.10 .10 -.01 .00 -.06 -.10 -.17* -.04 -.01 -.08 -.03 -.07 -.05 
20 Mkt12-Skin .17* .05 -.03 .02 -.02 .18* .38* -.19* -.10 -.15* -.06 -.02 -.14* -.05 -.12 -.09 
21 Mkt13-Neurologics -.08 .04 -.02 -.08 .07 .01 -.02 -.07 -.06 -.12 -.02 -.01 -.05 -.02 -.04 -.03 
22 Mkt14-Oncolytics .15* .08 -.03 -.10 .11 .06 .15* -.13 -.12 -.20* -.04 -.01 -.08 -.03 -.07 -.05 
23 Mkt15-Ophthalmics -.12 -.03 .04 -.06 .06 -.01 -.02 -.09 -.09 -.15* -.03 -.01 -.06 -.02 -.05 -.04 
24 Mkt16-Relief of pain .06 .17* .04 .00 .01 -.04 .00 .07 .15* .15* -.08 -.03 -.17* -.06 -.15 -.11 
25 Mkt18-Respiratory tract -.02 -.08 -.17 -.06 .03 -.09 -.12 -.14 -.15 .00 -.08 -.03 -.18* -.06 -.16 -.12 
26 Tech1-Oral solid -.13 .11 .02 -.17 .16* -.08 -.09 .12 .16* .23 -.22 -.08 -.15* -.04 .16 .21 
27 Tech2-Oral liquid -.04 -.21* .03 -.05 .05 .01 -.09 -.01 -.06 -.08 -.07 -.02 .03 -.05 -.13 .02 
28 Tech3-Topical .20* -.07 -.06 -.01 .00 .11 .36* -.18* -.14 -.14 .10 -.02 -.06 -.05 -.13 -.10 
29 Tech4-Injection .07 .16* .02 .20 -.18* -.03 -.05 .03 .00 -.05 .21 .14 .19 .15* .02 -.15* 
30 Tech5-Ocular/Otic -.10 -.21* -.05 .14* -.15 .00 -.04 -.02 -.04 -.05 -.04 -.01 .13 -.03 -.07 -.06 
31 Firm Stages .03 .07 .25* -.43 .47* .50* -.06 .05 .09 -.08 .05 -.04 -.13 -.03 .02 0.09 
   
   
128
 
No Variable 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
16 Mkt6-CNS 1.00               
17 Mkt8-Gastrointestinals -.05 1.00              
18 Mkt9-Metaboics/Nutrients -.04 -.05 1.00             
19 Mkt10-Hormone -.07 -.04 -.04 1.00            
20 Mkt12-Skin -.02 -.07 -.07 -.05 1.00           
21 Mkt13-Neurologics -.04 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03 1.00          
22 Mkt14-Oncolytics -.03 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.05 -.02 1.00         
23 Mkt15-Ophthalmics -.08 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.02 1.00        
24 Mkt16-Relief of pain -.09 -.08 -.08 -.06 -.12 -.04 -.06 -.05 1.00       
25 Mkt18-Respiratory tract -.02 -.09 -.09 -.07 -.13 -.04 -.07 -.06 -.15* 1.00      
26 Tech1-Oral solid .31* -.02 .07 -.01 -.26* .09 -.19* -.15* .29* .07 1.00     
27 Tech2-Oral liquid -.07 .31* -.07 .04 -.10 -.03 -.06 -.05 -.07 .20* -.35* 1.00    
28 Tech3-Topical -.12 -.07 -.07 .04 .77* -.03 -.06 -.05 -.12 -.13 -.35* -.11 1.00   
29 Tech4-Injection -.04 -.12 .05 -.02 -.11 -.05 .34* -.07 -.15* -.17* -.55* -.17* -.17 1.00  
30 Tech5-Ocular/Otic .01 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.02 -.03 .56 -.07 -.08 -.20* -.06 -.06 -.10 1.00 
31 Firm Stages .01 -.04 0.15* .00 .16* .15* .07 -.09 -.09 .00 .02 -.02 .01 -0.1 .01 
* P< .05 
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APPENDIX V: CONDITIONAL LOGIT REGRESSION ON TECHNOLOGY CHOICES 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Product Density  -.000*** -.001*** -.001*** -.000*** -.000* -.000† 
Product Entrants  .007*** .006*** .000 -.000 -.002 -.002 
Technology Density  .023*** .027*** .024*** .022*** .017*** .013** 
Technology Entrants  .026*** .022** .050*** .052*** .056*** .053*** 
Technology Firm Density*Venture Status   -.026***     
Technology Experience    .129*** .145*** .213*** .217*** 
Tech. Experience*age     -.000***   
Tech. Experience* Tech. Knowledge 
Breadth 
     -.043***  
Tech. Experience* Innovative Knowledge       -.106*** 
Firm Stages2   -2.462***     
Firm Stages3   -3.189***     
Firm Stages4   .482†     
Firm Stages5   -2.427***     
Firm Stages6   -2.656***     
Technology Knowledge Breadth2      .198*  
Technology Knowledge Breadth3      .003  
Technology Knowledge Breadth4      -.026  
Technology Knowledge Breadth5      .459***  
Technology Knowledge Breadth6      .180  
Innovative Knowledge2       -.834*** 
Innovative Knowledge3       -.623*** 
Innovative Knowledge4       -.233† 
Innovative Knowledge5       -.541** 
Innovative Knowledge6       -1.450*** 
Firm Size2 -.019*** -.012*** -.009*** .063*** .063*** .036*** .057*** 
Firm Size3 -.026*** -.015*** -.011*** .057*** .057*** .035*** .050*** 
Firm Size4 -.013*** -.007*** -.010*** .049*** .046*** .027*** .040*** 
Firm Size5 -.080*** -.041*** -.037*** .052*** .052*** .004 .040*** 
Firm Size6 -.042*** -.021*** -.018*** .083*** .082*** .044*** .076*** 
Firm Age2 -.013*** .002 .001 -.003† -.004* -.002 .001 
Firm Age3 -.004*** .010*** .008*** .005*** .004** .005** .007*** 
Firm Age4 -.004*** -.009*** .015*** .007*** .006*** .007*** .006*** 
Firm Age5 .000 .016*** .017*** .010*** .009*** .008*** .010*** 
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Firm Age6 -.017*** .003 .003 .002 -.002 .001 .006** 
Lambda2 -.098*** 1.422*** 2.295*** .953*** .927*** .716** .638** 
Lambda3 -.032*** 1.465*** 2.597*** 1.260*** 1.273*** 1.119*** 1.039*** 
Lambda4 -.644*** 1.524*** -.585* 1.113*** 1.136*** .957*** .875*** 
Lambda5 -2.925*** .442 .820* .731* .700* .165 .305 
Lambda6 -3.053*** .367 1.096** .274 .408 -.086 .387 
        
Decisions 4329 4329 4329 4329 4329 4329 4329 
Cases 25974 25974 25974 25974 25974 25974 25974 
Log Likelihood -5660 -5076 -4839 -3203 -3192 -2989 -3134 
Chi-Square (d.f.) 4139.1(12)
*** 
5362(16)*** 5834.6(22)*** 9106.6(17)*** 9128.4(18)*** 9534.6(23)
*** 
9245.2(23) 
*** 
McFadden’s R-Square .270 .346 .376 .587 .588 .615 .596 
Change in Chi-Square (d.f.)  (2) vs (1) 
1223(4)*** 
(3) vs (2) 
472.6(6)*** 
(4) vs (2) 
3744.6(1)*** 
(5) vs (4) 
21.8(1)*** 
(6)vs (4) 
428 (6)*** 
(8)vs(4) 
138.6(6)*** 
 † p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
131
APPENDIX VI: CONDITIONAL LOGIT REGRESSION ON MARKET CHOICES 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Market Density  .000 .001* -.000 -.000 .000 -.000† 
Market Entrants  .035*** .034*** .035*** .035*** .035*** .033*** 
Market Size  -5.752 -3.868 2.405** 2.401** 2.997*** 2.270** 
Market Experience    .091*** .091*** .240*** .163*** 
Market Experience* Age     -.000   
Market Experience* Market 
Knowledge Breadth 
     -.016***  
Market Experience* 
Innovative Knowledge 
      -.084*** 
Market Density* 
Firm Stages 
  -.002***     
Firm Stages2   -.629     
Firm Stages3   .040     
Firm Stages4   -1.145†     
Firm Stages5   1.135**     
Firm Stages6   .859*     
Firm Stages7   -.711     
Firm Stages8   -.362     
Firm Stages9   .733†     
Firm Stages10   .853†     
Firm Stages11   -.636     
Firm Stages12   -1.000**     
Firm Stages13   .415     
Firm Stages14   1.911***     
Firm Stages15   -.287     
Firm Stages16   .871*     
Firm Stages17   -1.743*     
Firm Stages18   -.295     
Firm Stages19   -.552     
Market Knowledge Breadth2      -.075  
Market Knowledge Breadth3      -.163***  
Market Knowledge Breadth4      -.122*  
Market Knowledge Breadth5      -.095*  
Market Knowledge Breadth6      -.118**  
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Market Knowledge Breadth7      .008  
Market Knowledge Breadth8      -.053  
Market Knowledge Breadth9      -.063  
Market Knowledge Breadth10      .017  
Market Knowledge Breadth11      -.159  
Market Knowledge Breadth12      -.213***  
Market Knowledge Breadth13      .011  
Market Knowledge Breadth14      .073  
Market Knowledge Breadth15      -.242***  
Market Knowledge Breadth16      -.113**  
Market Knowledge Breadth17      -.245*  
Market Knowledge Breadth18      -.113*  
Market Knowledge Breadth19      -.188†  
Innovative Knowledge2       -.417 
Innovative Knowledge3       .266 
Innovative Knowledge4       -1.156 
Innovative Knowledge5       .580** 
Innovative Knowledge7       .281* 
Innovative Knowledge8       -.404 
Innovative Knowledge9       -.036 
Innovative Knowledge10       .490 
Innovative Knowledge11       -1.107* 
Innovative Knowledge12       .188 
Innovative Knowledge13       .283 
Innovative Knowledge14       .668* 
Innovative Knowledge15       -.034 
Innovative Knowledge16       .714* 
Innovative Knowledge17       -1.680** 
Innovative Knowledge18       .199 
Innovative Knowledge19       -.489 
Firm Size2 .006 .005 .006 .008 .008 .012 .009 
Firm Size3 .013*** .007* .007† -.008* -.008* .019** -.007† 
Firm Size4 .019*** .016*** .016*** .018*** .018*** .023** .020*** 
Firm Size5 .022*** .015*** .015*** -.005 -.005 .017* -.005 
Firm Size6 .021*** .016*** .015*** -.000 -.000 .020** -.000 
Firm Size7 .012* .011* .010† .014** .014** .008 .013* 
Firm Size8 .017*** .011*** .011** .010** .010** .016* .009* 
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Firm Size9 .013*** .009** .008* .008* .008* .015* .006 
Firm Size10 .023*** .018*** .016*** .014*** .014*** .017* .011** 
Firm Size11 -.024† -.017 -.015 -.014 -.014 .007 -.003 
Firm Size12 .008* .004 .005 -.004 -.004 .020*** -.005 
Firm Size13 .017*** .012*** .011** .011** .011** .013† .010* 
Firm Size14 .015*** .011** .007† .010** .010** .006 .007 
Firm Size15 -.012** -.010* -.008† -.007 -.007 .021* -.006 
Firm Size16 .018*** .012*** .011** -.000 -.000 .019** -.002 
Firm Size17 .013* .011* .014* .014* .014* .026** .019** 
Firm Size18 .007† .005 .005 .002 .002 .015* .001 
Firm Size19 -.014 -.009 -.007 -.007 -.006 .016 .002 
Firm Age2 -.023*** -.018*** -.020*** -.018*** -.018*** -.016** -.015* 
Firm Age3 .010*** .002 .000 .002 .002 .002 .001 
Firm Age4 -.024*** -.019*** -.021*** -.020*** -.020*** -.012* -.010† 
Firm Age5 .007** -.004 -.003 -.003 -.003 -.004 -.005 
Firm Age6 .005† -.005† -.004 -.004 -.004 -.004 -.005 
Firm Age7 -.021*** -.016** -.017** -.016** -.016** -.017** -.013† 
Firm Age8 -.004 -.005 -.005† -.004 -.004 -.002 -.004 
Firm Age9 -.007 -.007* -.004 -.006* -.006* -.004 -.009* 
Firm Age10 -.014*** -.012*** -.009* -.010** -.010** -.014*** -.014*** 
Firm Age11 -.021** -.106* -.017* -.016* -.016* -.014† -.009 
Firm Age12 .009** .004† .002 .003 .003 .003 .003 
Firm Age13 -.012** -.011** -.009* -.010** -.010** -.011** -.011* 
Firm Age14 -.017*** -.015*** -.007† -.013*** -.013*** -.016*** -.018*** 
Firm Age15 .008** .006* .006† .005† .005† .007* .005 
Firm Age16 .009*** .002 .002 .000 .000 -.000 -.003 
Firm Age17 -.031*** -.024*** -.028*** -.023*** -.023*** -.014 -.011 
Firm Age18 .002 -.002 -.003 -.001 -.001 .001 -.001 
Firm Age19 -.031*** -.024*** -.025*** -.023*** -.023*** -.019** -.020* 
Lambda2 -2.507** -1.818* -.946 -1.793* -1.790* -.603 -1.331 
Lambda3 3.193*** 1.790*** 2.031*** 1.365*** 1.365*** .773† 1.324** 
Lambda4 -3.071*** -2.399*** -1.061 -2.384*** -2.378** -.824 -1.470† 
Lambda5 2.417*** .694† -.039 1.007** 1.000** .128 .762† 
Lambda6 2.289*** .810* .203 .721† .724* .051 .694 
Lambda7 -3.366*** -2.629*** -1.457 -2.548*** -2.543*** -.861 -1.945* 
Lambda8 1.424*** 1.336*** 1.617** 1.207** 1.203** .580 1.118* 
Lambda9 .792† .777† -.253 .717 .716 .031 .173 
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Lambda10 -.071 -.021 -1.305† -.017 -.016 -.772 -.242 
Lambda11 -1.970* -1.423† -.777 -1.370† -1.369† -.440 -1.076 
Lambda12 2.553*** 2.056*** 2.661*** 2.039*** 2.039*** 2.107*** 1.730*** 
Lambda13 .299 .419 -.328 .401 .401 -.410 .029 
Lambda14 1.504*** 1.485*** -1.384* 1.310** 1.307** -.001 .771 
Lambda15 .351 .537 .570 .573 .572 .215 .409 
Lambda16 2.413*** 1.119** .576 1.130** 1.131** .458 .724† 
Lambda17 -2.923*** -2.219** -.904 -2.184** -2.180** -.469 -1.477† 
Lambda18 2.406*** 1.973*** 2.222*** 1.625*** 1.624*** 1.217** 1.203** 
Lambda19 -1.295† -.730 -.275 -.752 -.752 -.271 -.530 
        
Decisions 4329 4329 4329 4329 4329 4329 4329 
Cases 82251 82251 82251 82251 82251 82251 82251 
Log Likelihood -10714 -10235 -10121 -9815 -9815 -9581 -9727 
Chi-Square (d.f.) 4064.3(57)**
* 
5023.7(60)*** 5250.2(79)*** 5863.6(61)*** 5863.6(62)*** 6330.3(82)*** 6039.5(82)***
McFadden’s R-Square .159 .197 .206 .23 .23 .248 .237 
Change in Chi-Square (d.f.)  (2) vs. (1) 
959.4(3)*** 
(3) vs. 2 
226.5(19)*** 
(4) vs. (2) 
839.9(1)*** 
(5) vs. (4) 
0(1) 
(6) vs. (4) 
466.7(21)*** 
(8) vs. (4) 
175.9(21)*** 
 † p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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